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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters that aim to build a framework which can
be used to study interactions between the labour market and macroeconomic dynam-
ics. To achieve this, we reformulate a standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model to include search and matching frictions in the
labour market and heterogeneity in price and wage stickiness.
The first chapter, coauthored with Professor Engin Kara, builds a real busi-
ness cycle model with labour search frictions and heterogeneity in wage stickiness.
Shimer’s (2005) critique on labour search models, that it cannot explain observed
unemployment movements, reignited a long-standing debate on unemployment fluc-
tuations and wage determination. Gertler and Trigari (2009) introduce wage stick-
iness to the model to match unemployment volatility, while Pissarides (2009) finds
this modification not satisfactory, citing evidence on high wage cyclicality. We find
heterogeneity in wage stickiness in microdata on wages. Our model, which reflects
this heterogeneity, matches the data better than its one sector alternatives.
The second chapter, coauthored with Professor Engin Kara, studies output dy-
namics in New Keynesian models with the standard labour market and heterogeneity
in price stickiness. We analytically and numerically show that these models can re-
produce a hump-shaped output response to persistent monetary shocks, which is a
key feature of monetary transmission mechanism. The version of models without
heterogeneity cannot generate a hump. Flexible prices in models with heterogeneity
play a crucial role, by generating inertia to price-setting and output.
The third chapter studies how the labour search frictions affect output dynamics
in New Keynesian models, when combined with heterogeneity in nominal rigidi-
ties. Long-term employment relationship, that arises under search and matching
framework, makes marginal costs history dependent. We show that this history
dependence generates inertia in the model. Heterogeneity in nominal rigidities sig-
nificantly reinforces this inertia, resulting in a hump-shaped output response to per-
sistent monetary shocks. The model without the search frictions cannot replicate a
hump even when monetary shocks are persistent, when wages are sticky.
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Introduction
The theory of the labour market has long been at the centre of economic theories,
dating back at least to David Ricardo (1817, chapter 5). The predictions of macroe-
conomic theories mainly depend on how the labour market is modelled. For example,
Keynes (1936) based his critique on classical economists, such as Pigou (1968), on
their strange supposition about how wages and the labour supply and demand are
determined. If our view on the labour market changes, our view on the macroecon-
omy changes, yielding different policy implications. This dissertation contributes to
macroeconomic theories by developing a framework for a better understanding of
the labour market and by exploring the implications of this framework for output
dynamics, and more broadly for macroeconomy.
Our starting point is search and matching theory in the labour market. This the-
ory, of which three inventors, Diamond (1982a,b), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides
(1985)1, were awarded a Nobel Prize in economics in 2010, has become a standard
tool in analysis of unemployment dynamics. As Shimer (2005) explains, this model
is attractive for many reasons: it provides an appealing description of the labour
market, and yet is analytically tractable; comparative statics are intuitive and rich;
it can be adapted to answer a number of policy questions about the labour market.
Shimer (2005), however, also points out that the labour search theory cannot ex-
plain the cyclical behaviour of unemployment observed in U.S. data for a standard
calibration (see also Costain and Reiter (2008)). This is called the unemployment
volatility puzzle (Pissarides (2009)). A large body of literature emerged to take
on this puzzle. One important approach to the problem, following Keynes (1936),
proposes to solve the puzzle by introducing wage stickiness to the model (Shimer
1See also Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
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(2005) and Hall (2005)). Gertler and Trigari (2009) carry this intuition to a gen-
eral equilibrium Real Business Cycle (RBC) framework. They show that this model
can explain key movements in labour market activity, including large volatility in
unemployment. The intuition behind this result is that the response of wages to pro-
ductivity shocks becomes muted, and firms create jobs aiming to capture a larger
surplus from new jobs. Pissarides (2009) disagrees with this modification, arguing
that wages are flexible at the relevant margin. Citing micro-evidence on high cycli-
cality of wages, he argues that wage stickiness cannot be an answer to the puzzle.
This ongoing (and long-standing) debate gives rise to our first research question:
how to explain observed volatility of unemployment and high wage cyclicality at the
same time? Can wage stickiness be indeed an answer to the puzzle?
This question is particularly interesting, because it also poses an important chal-
lenge for monetary policy analysis. Modern monetary business-cycle models rely on
price and wage stickiness to generate large real effects of monetary policy. For ex-
ample, standard medium-sized New Keynesian general equilibrium models, such as
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007), typ-
ically adopt wage stickiness. If wages are indeed flexible at the relevant margin,
these models need to find an additional mechanism to explain the effects of mone-
tary policy shocks. In this case, as Basu and House (2016) argue, price stickiness
likely plays a substantially more important role than wage stickiness in explaining
economic fluctuations.
In the first chapter, we build a model that can address this question. Then, in
the second and the third chapters, we explore broader macroeconomic implications
of our model in New Keynesian environment. In the second chapter, we first develop
a novel approach to summarise simple New Keynesian models to one reduced-form
output equation. Applying the method of undetermined coefficients to this equation
reveals information on the degree of inertia in the model. In the third chapter, by
using this approach, we find that our model shows a significant departure from
models with the standard labour market, in terms of output dynamics. The specific
aspects of output dynamics that we aim to match with our model is related to our
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second research question.
The second research question of this dissertation concerns the real effects of mon-
etary policy shocks. In particular, we focus on a hump-shaped response in aggregate
spending to monetary shocks. The observation on monetary nonneutrality, i.e., that
monetary policy has significant real effects in the short-run, dates back at least to
David Hume (1752). Many modern empirical studies have explored the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. A key finding of these studies is that real activities
demonstrate a hump-shaped and gradual response to monetary shocks (see, e.g.,
Sims (1986), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996, 1999), and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997)). As Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2017) state, a com-
mon prescription to this problem is to assume habit-formation in consumption. For
example, widely-used medium-sized New Keynesian DSGE models such as Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) adopt this
assumption. While we can find evidence from finance and growth literature that
support the assumption (Fuhrer (2000) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt
(2017)), there also have been studies that propose alternative mechanisms, argu-
ing that this assumption remains ad-hoc and therefore subject to Lucas’s (1976)
critique.
In order to answer these two research questions, this dissertation pays attention
to heterogeneity in price and wage stickiness. Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008) find that heterogeneity in price stickiness is an important
feature of micro-evidence on prices. In recent years, many studies have explored
the potential of this heterogeneity to help New Keynesian models in addressing
important criticisms on them (see, for example, Carvalho (2006), Dixon and Kara
(2010a), Dixon and Le Bihan (2012), and Kara (2015), among others). Based on
this success, Taylor (2016) concludes that "future research would likely yield large
benefits if it moved on from representative staggered wage and price setting models
to heterogeneous staggered wage and price setting models."
Note that the labour search theory and heterogeneity in nominal rigidities have
been studied extensively, but separately. We bring these two distinct studies together
10
and show that interactions between them can help us address two important chal-
lenges in macroeconomic modelling. To the best of our knowledge, this dissertation
is the first attempt to do so.
In the first chapter, as mentioned, we take up the first challenge. We intro-
duce heterogeneity in wage stickiness, based on micro-data on wage stickiness in US
economy, provided by Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014). The distribution of
wage spells clearly indicates that there is heterogeneity in wage stickiness. We ex-
tend an otherwise standard search and matching model to reflect this heterogeneity.
There are many sectors, each with a different degree of wage stickiness. In each
sector, there is a Calvo-type contract in a Multiple Calvo (MC) model. Following
the suggestion of Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014) that the wage data favour
Taylor-type contracts than Calvo-type contracts, we also consider a version of our
model in which within each sector, there is a Taylor-style contract. Hence a Gen-
eralised Taylor Economy (GTE). In this way, we make methodological contribution
to the literature by generalising the Calvo-type staggered bargaining, proposed by
Gertler and Trigari (2009), to another important time-dependent contract structure,
within search and matching framework.
We evaluate the extent to which our models can match both the volatility of
labour market variables, as reported in Shimer (2005) and Gertler and Trigari (2009),
and the cyclicality of wages as reported in Pissarides (2009) and Haefke, Sonntag,
and Van Rens (2013). Our results suggest that all four models generate similar level
of volatility in labour market variables to that in the data. However, the models
differ significantly about their predictions of the cyclicality of wages. In the MC and
the GTE, the semi-elasticity of wage to unemployment is twice as large as that in
the Taylor model and is closer to that suggested by the data. We further find that
the reason for higher elasticity in the GTE and in the MC is the presence of flexible
wages. Since flexible wages respond more to shocks than sticky wages, average wages
in the two models are more sensitive to shocks than their one-sector counterparts.
While average wages in sectors with sticky wages do not change much in response
to shocks, they do in the flexible sector, resulting in cyclical aggregate wages.
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The second and the third chapters involve a hump-shaped output response to
monetary shocks. The challenge is to generate inertia in output dynamics in an
otherwise purely forward-looking model, as habit-formation does. Let us begin with
the role of heterogeneity in price stickiness for output dynamics. In the second
chapter, we present a simple New Keynesian model with the standard labour market.
There are many sectors, each with a different contract length. We calibrate the
model by using micro-data on price stickiness provided by Bils and Klenow (2004).
We find that, when monetary policy shocks are persistent, an interaction between
sectors with flexible prices and those with sticky prices leads to a hump-shaped
output response.
The key to our results is the role played by flexible prices. We formally demon-
strate how the presence of flexible prices makes price-setting less forward-looking.
To understand this, first note that sectors with flexible prices respond more to shocks
than the ones with sticky prices. Soon after the shock, to preserve relative prices and
demand, flexible-price firms reduce their prices to bring them in line with those in
sticky-price sectors. As a consequence, inflation in the flexible-price sector depends
negatively on relative price in that sector in the previous period. This behaviour
makes price-setting history dependent in the sense that inflation in the flexible-price
sector and, in turn, aggregate inflation depend on lagged relative prices. Relative
prices are related to output. Therefore, output in the previous period becomes rele-
vant. This history dependence, in the presence of persistent monetary policy shocks,
leads to a hump-shaped response in output.
For our analysis, we propose a novel method to summarise a simple New Keyne-
sian model with and without heterogeneity in price stickiness to one reduced-form
equation for output dynamics. By applying the method of undetermined coefficients
to this equation, we show that output in the multi-sector model can be expressed as
an autoregressive process, where output depends on its own lag and monetary policy
shocks. A higher share of flexible prices implies a greater coefficient on lagged out-
put, leading to a larger hump. The Calvo model, a special case of the multi-sector
model when the share of the flexible-price sector is zero, cannot generate a hump,
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as output lacks backward-looking behavior.
In the third chapter, we bring together our findings in the first and the sec-
ond chapters. Our aim is to revisit the role of the search and matching frictions
for output dynamics in New Keynesian business cycle models, in combination with
heterogeneity in nominal rigidities. Many studies have introduced the search and
matching frictions in the labour market in New Keynesian environment. The con-
clusions of these studies are mixed. For example, Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2009)
study how the search and matching frictions affect the effects of monetary policy
shocks. They find that the search frictions increase output responses relative to
otherwise similar models with the standard labour market. In contrast, Krause and
Lubik (2007) point out that the precise role of the search frictions in Walsh (2005)
and Trigari (2009) are difficult to assess, due to model assumptions other than the
search frictions such as habit formation. Based on an analysis of a simple New Key-
nesian model with the search frictions, they conclude that the search frictions per
se do not affect the mechanism that generates endogenous persistence in the model.
Our main point of departure from these studies is that we introduce hetero-
geneity in price and wage stickiness. We build on the real business cycle model
with the search and matching frictions and wage rigidity, that we developed in the
first chapter. We bring this model into New Keynesian environment and introduce
heterogeneity in price stickiness.
Our key finding is that long-term employment relationship that arises under
search and matching framework makes marginal costs history dependent: marginal
costs depend on lagged output level. Search and matching models explicitly stipulate
that previously-employed workers stay in the job for a long period of time. In a model
with the standard labour market, where hiring is costless, this would not matter.
But with a costly and time-consuming hiring process, the (partial) continuation
of previously created job matches implies that firms could save hiring costs in the
current period thanks to past hiring activities, and hence, with other things equal,
marginal costs would be lower if they hired more workers in the past. As a result,
lagged employment, and lagged output level affect marginal costs in the current
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period. Inflation depends on marginal costs, and on lagged output level. Therefore
previous path of output becomes relevant.
By using the method that we developed in the second chapter, it is analyti-
cally shown that output exhibits an inertial response. The inertia becomes stronger
when labour contracts are based on longer-term relationship. With our baseline
calibration, this effect of the search frictions alone is modest. When combined with
heterogeneity in nominal rigidities, however, this tendency is significantly magnified.
On the other hand, we show that the potential of heterogeneity in price stickiness to
generate a hump in output, which is explored in the second chapter, can be weakened
if wages are sticky. This is because even flexible prices do not adjust to shocks due to
sluggish adjustments of marginal costs. When we introduce the search frictions, the
potential of heterogeneity in price stickiness is reinvigorated. We conclude that the
search frictions and heterogeneity in nominal rigidities reinforce each other to yield
a mechanism that generates inertia in the model. This results in a hump-shaped
output response to monetary shocks.
14
Chapter 1
Unemployment volatility,
the cyclicality of wages
and heterogeneity in wage stickiness
1.1 Introduction
The search and matching model proposed by Diamond (1982a,b),
Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985) (see also Mortensen and Pissarides (1994))
has been a standard tool in analysing unemployment dynamics. The model is rich
enough to account for several important features of labour market dynamics. In
the model, in each period, a certain fraction of workers lose their job and search
for a new one. Aiming to capture the difference between workers’ productivity and
workers’ wage, firms create new jobs. The model can account for the fact that in a
tight market, firms find it difficult to hire new workers.
However, Shimer (2005) criticises the model on the grounds that it cannot gen-
erate sufficient volatility in labour market variables in response to an increase in
productivity, calling into question the empirical relevance of the model. This result
is a consequence of the model’s assumption that wages are fully flexible. The reason
for this result is that all the increase in productivity is absorbed by wages, leaving
no incentive to firms to create jobs. As a result, in contrast to empirical findings,
employment does not change much in the model.
Shimer’s conclusion started a lively debate on how best to model wages in a
search and matching model. The first strand of the literature, following Keynes
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(1936), proposes to solve the puzzle by introducing wage stickiness to the model
(Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005)). Gertler and Trigari (2009) carry this intuition to a
general equilibrium Real Business Cycle (RBC) framework. They show that adding
wage stickiness to the model leads to spillover effects, resulting in larger fluctuations
in unemployment and in other labour market variables. Since wages are sticky,
not all wages are adjusted to reflect the increased productivity. As a consequence,
relative to the increased productivity, wages paid by some employers remain low,
lowering workers’ opportunity costs. For this reason, workers who negotiate their
wages ask for lower wages than they otherwise would. Increased productivity and
low wages induce firms to create jobs, reducing unemployment further.
Another strand of the literature, namely that of Pissarides (2009), disagrees
with the idea of introducing wage stickiness to the model. Pissarides (2009) argues
that the relevant wage for job creation is new hires’ wages and the micro-data on
wages suggest that these wages are significantly more volatile than existing workers’
wage. Based on this evidence, he concludes that new hires’ wages cannot be sticky.
Therefore, wage stickiness cannot be the answer to the puzzle.
Recently, Gertler, Huckfeldt, and Trigari (2016) question the validity of the
finding that new hires’ wages are more cyclical than those of existing workers and,
therefore, the notion that new hires’ wages are flexible. They argue that the finding is
a consequence of the common failure to account for the fact that during expansions
some workers may be moving to higher-paying jobs. Their findings suggest that,
once such job changes are accounted for in the estimation, the wages of newly hired
workers are not significantly more cyclical than those of existing workers. Stuber
(2017) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) reach similar conclusions.
The finding of Gertler, Huckfeldt, and Trigari (2016), however, does not put the
debate to rest. Empirical studies surveyed by Pissarides (2009) suggest that the
wages of existing workers are highly cyclical, too. For example, findings reported in
Haefke, Sonntag, and Van Rens (2013) indicate that one percentage point increase
in the unemployment rate leads to a 1− 1.5% decrease in real wages. If it is indeed
the case that wage cyclicality is a good measure of wage flexibility, the evidence
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provided by Gertler, Huckfeldt, and Trigari (2016) does not provide a strong case
against Pissarides’s argument that wages are flexible.
The finding of Gertler, Huckfeldt, and Trigari (2016) that new hires’ wages are
the same as those of continuing workers is also important in that it opens the door
to make use of the micro-evidence that are available for existing workers’ wages.
While, to the best of our knowledge, the direct evidence of wage stickiness for new
hires’ wages is not available, there is evidence for existing workers’ wages. In their
online appendix, Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014) provide evidence for the
distribution of wage spells for the US economy. The data are based on the Survey
of Income and Program Participation conducted by the US Census Bureau and are
for the period from 1996 to 2000. The distribution of wage spells is reported in
Figure 1.1. As the figure shows, even though the data are for existing workers, there
are plenty of wages that are relatively flexible, providing support for Pissarides’s
argument. The proportion of wages that change within a year is more than 50%.
There are also quite a few long wage contracts. The distribution has a peak at
one year. The average wage spells, which include incomplete durations, is around 6
quarters.
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 42 44 48
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Figure 1.1: Distribution of wage spells in Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014)
Note: The wage data was recorded every 4 months. Each bar denotes the corresponding share for
each 4-months period.
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The challenge is to develop a model that can match both the observed volatility of
unemployment and the high cyclicality of wages. This chapter takes this challenge.
To achieve this, we introduce heterogeneity in wage stickiness suggested by micro-
evidence on wages to an otherwise standard search and matching model. There are
many sectors, each with a different degree of wage stickiness. To be more specific,
we assume that there is a large number of firms and of households. Households
have many members, who can be both unemployed and employed. We group firms
according to the degree of wage stickiness they face. There are N groups (or sectors).
As in the standard search and matching model, firms post vacancies and hire in a
common labour market. Therefore, the only difference between our model and the
standard model is the contract structure. Indeed, our model has the standard search
and matching model and the model by Gertler and Trigari (2009), as special cases.
When all sectors have flexible wages, we have the standard search and matching
model. When all sectors face the same degree of wage stickiness, the model becomes
the same as that in Gertler and Trigari (2009).
As it is common in the literature, we assume the probability of wage change is
constant, as in the Calvo model and interpret each wage spell reported in Figure 1.1
as a Calvo wage reset probability. We use these probabilities to calibrate our model,
resulting in a Multiple Calvo (MC) model. Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014)
suggest that the wage data favour Taylor-type contracts than Calvo-type contracts.
Based on this finding, we also consider a version of our model in which within each
sector, there is a Taylor-style contract, giving rise to a Generalised Taylor Economy
(GTE). Using the wage spells data and the formula put forward by Dixon and
Kara (2006), we calculate the distribution of completed durations. The resulting
distribution is used to calibrate the GTE. Finally, we consider the versions of these
models without heterogeneity: the simple Taylor and the Calvo models.
We evaluate the extent to which our model can match both the volatility of labour
market variables, as reported in Shimer (2005) and Gertler and Trigari (2009), and
the cyclicality of wages as reported in Pissarides (2009) and Haefke, Sonntag, and
Van Rens (2013). Our results suggest that all four models generate more or less the
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same level of volatility in labour market variables. These volatilities are similar to
those in the data. However, the models differ significantly about their predictions
of the cyclicality of wages. In the MC and GTE, average wage is significantly more
responsive to productivity shocks than the Taylor and the Calvo models. In the
Taylor model, the semi-elasticity of wages to unemployment is the lowest, since only
a small fraction of wages adjust in each period. In the MC and the GTE, the semi-
elasticity is twice as large as that in the Taylor model and is closer to that suggested
by the data.
The reason for higher elasticity is the presence of flexible wages in the GTE
and in the MC. Since flexible wages respond more to shocks than sticky wages,
average wages in the two models are more sensitive to shocks than their one-sector
counterparts. While average wages in sectors with sticky wages do not change much
in response to shocks, they do in the flexible sector, resulting in cyclical aggregate
wages.
There are many studies that provide theoretical justification for wage rigidity;
Menzio and Moen (2010), Menzio (2005), and Kennan (2010) to name a few. Menzio
and Moen (2010) is especially relevant for our work. Menzio and Moen (2010)
provide a mechanism that justifies the finding of Gertler, Huckfeldt, and Trigari
(2016) that new hires’ and existing workers’ wages have similar degrees of wage
rigidity. They consider a labour market in which firms insure existing employees
against income fluctuations. They show that, if firms can commit to a wage policy
but not to employ workers, the optimal wage policy prescribes the same degree of
downward wage rigidity for both existing workers and new hires.
Kudlyak (2014) argues that the relevant margin for firms’ hiring decision is the
user cost of labour, which may be different from the current wages. In a model like
ours in which existing workers and new hires face the same degree of wage rigidity,
the user cost of labour is given by current wages and the hiring margin by the present
value of current and future wages over the contract spells. As a result, given that
sectors face different wage stickiness, there is heterogeneity in the user cost of labour
too.
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In the New Keynesian literature, accounting for the heterogeneity in prices has
proved to be helpful in addressing the criticisms directed at New Keynesian models
(see Taylor (2016) for a survey). For example, Kara (2015) shows that two disturbing
problems of the Smets and Wouters (2007) model, which is considered to be a state
of art instance of New Keynesian economics, disappear when heterogeneity in price
stickiness is introduced. First, the model requires large price shocks to explain
inflation dynamics (see Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009)) and, second, firm
level pricing in the model is inconsistent with that in reality (see Bils, Klenow, and
Malin (2012)).
Another paper that emphasises the importance of heterogeneity in price stick-
iness is Carvalho (2006). Different from Kara (2015), in which it is assumed that
there are sectors, each with a different contract length, Carvalho’s (2006) model
assumes that there are different industries. In the case of micro-data on prices (e.g.
Bils and Klenow (2004)), it happens that different industries face different degrees
of price stickiness. This is how heterogeneity in price stickiness is introduced to the
Carvalho’s (2006) model. However, wage data are different. Micro-data on wages
provided by Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014) suggest that there is little het-
erogeneity across industries, whereas there is a significant degree of heterogeneity in
wage spells, providing empirical support for the modelling approach in Kara (2015).
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 presents the log-linearised model and discusses the calibration of
model parameters. Section 4 evaluates the empirical performance of the model and
shows that models with heterogeneity in wage stickiness come closer in matching the
data. Section 5 explains why models with heterogeneity in wage stickiness match
the data better. Section 6 checks if the models pass the Barro’s (1977) test. Section
7 concludes the chapter.
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1.2 The model
We generalise the model of Gertler and Trigari (2009) to include many sectors, each
with a different contract length. As noted above, we consider two alternative ways
of modelling heterogeneity in wage stickiness: the GTE and the MC. There is a
continuum of competitive firms with index f ∈ [0, 1]. The firms are divided into
sectors with index i and sector shares are given by {αi}Ni=1. Corresponding to the
continuum of firms, there is a continuum of identical households of measure unity.
Households supply labour. Firms hire workers from a common labour market. In
the flexible-wage version of the model, once a worker finds a match with a firm,
they negotiate a wage rate. In the MC and in the GTE, when negotiating, firms
and workers take into account the fact that wages are sticky. In the MC, in each
sector i, a randomly chosen fraction 1−δi of wages are negotiated in each period. In
the GTE, sector i is divided into i cohorts: one cohort resets its wage in each period
for i−periods. The standard Calvo and the simple Taylor models are a special case
of the model, when all sectors face the same degree of wage stickiness1.
The rest of model assumptions are standard. The government uses lump-sum
tax to finance the unemployment benefit, which is paid to unemployed workers. A
firm’s workforce consists of workers that are employed in the past and new hires.
It is assumed that firms lose a fraction λ of workers in each period. We denote the
employment of firm f in sector i in period t− 1 as nfit−1. After the separation, the
number of existing workers in the firm f in period t is given by (1−λ)nfit−1. In each
period, firm f posts vacancies vfit to hire new workers q(θt)vfit where q(θt) denotes
the vacancy-filling rate of the firms, which is defined below. The hiring rate of the
firm f is defined as xfit ≡ q(θt)vfit/nfit−1. Therefore, firm f ’s employment evolves
according to
nfit = (1− λ+ xfit)nfit−1 (1.1)
1Due to the assumption of constant returns in matching, and since it is assumed that all workers
have the same productivity, all workers are the same and set the same wage. In the firms that
are not chosen to renegotiate their wage contracts, all existing workers and new hires get the same
wage that is set in the past. Reset wages differ across sectors, since when firms and workers set
their wages, they set them for different horizons.
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This equation is based on the assumption that new hires participate in production
immediately. The same assumption is made in Blanchard and Gali (2010) and
Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008). In the rest of this section, we will outline the
main building blocks of the model. We first present the structures of the model that
are common to all models: the matching function, firms, household, the government,
and the market clearing condition. We then discuss the staggered wage bargaining
in the models.
1.2.1 The matching function
The search and matching process is standard and is done at the economy-wide level.
That is, job seekers are free to move to any sector when they find a job opportunity,
regardless of their previous employment history. Given these assumptions, the total
number of successful matches in the economy in period t is given by the following
matching function
m(ut, vt) ≡ µmuµt v1−µt , 0 < µ < 1
where vt (≡
∫ 1
0
vfit df) is the total number of vacancies posted by firms and ut is
the total number of job seekers (or unemployed workers) in the economy. µ and
µm denote the unemployment elasticity and the scale parameter of the matching
function, respectively. The total unemployment is given by ut = 1 − nt−1, since
it is assumed that all unemployed workers search for jobs and the newly separated
workers do not participate in searching in the same period. As is standard, we define
the job finding rate of workers as p(θt) ≡ m(ut,vt)/ut, the vacancy filling rate of firms
as q(θt) ≡ m(ut,vt)/vt, and the labour market tightness as θt ≡ vt/ut.
1.2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of competitive firms. A firm produces a homogeneous con-
sumption good. In each period, firm f employs nfit workers to produce output yfit.
Each worker receives a wage wfit. The production function with a constant returns
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to scale technology is given by
yfit = Atnfit (1.2)
At denotes productivity which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
at = ρaat−1 + at (1.3)
where at ≡ logAt and at is an iid productivity shock with mean zero. The firm posts
vfit vacancies and hires q(θt)vfit workers in period t. The hiring process is costly.
Following Gertler and Trigari (2009), we assume that hiring costs take the following
form
κ
2
x2fit nfit−1
Taking into account exogenous job separations and newly created matches the
law of motion of the employment stock in firm f is given by
nfit = (1− λ+ xfit)nfit−1 (1.4)
In each period firm f chooses xfit to maximise its value by taking the total
number of its employees at the beginning of period t (nfit−1) and the current and
expected future path of wages as given. Specifically firms solve the following problem
Ffit(nfit−1) = max
xfit
{Atnfit − wfitnfit − κ
2
x2fitnfit−1 + Etβt,t+1Ffit+1(nfit)} (1.5)
subject to nfit = (1−λ+xfit)nfit−1. βt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor between
periods t and t + 1 and will be defined below. The solution to this maximisation
problem results in the job creation condition of the firm, which is given by
κxfit = At − wfit + Etβt,t+1{κ
2
x2fit+1 + (1− λ)κxfit+1} (1.6)
This equation shows that the hiring rate depends on the net marginal product of
labour (At − wfit), savings on hiring costs in the next period and the continuation
value of the match.
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We define JFfit(wfit) as the firm’s marginal surplus when it hires an additional
worker at the wage rate wfit. This is given by
JFfit(wfit) = At − wfit + Etβt,t+1{
κ
2
x2fit+1 + (1− λ)JFfit+1(wfit+1)} (1.7)
By comparing the last two equations, we note that
JFfit(wfit) = κxfit (1.8)
This equation requires that in equilibrium the value of an additional worker to be
equalized with the costs of adding one more worker.
1.2.3 Households
As it is standard in this literature, we use the representative family setup proposed
by Merz (1995). As noted earlier, there is a continuum of identical households. Each
household has a continuum of members, which can either be workers or unemployed.
While household members work in different sectors, they pool income together and
get full risk sharing within the household. As a consequence of these assumptions,
all household members consume the same amount. An unemployed member of the
representative household receives unemployment benefit. The representative house-
hold holds bonds and is a shareholder of firms and receives dividends. Given these
assumptions, the representative household’s life-time utility and the corresponding
budget constraint are given by
Ut = max
c,B
c1−σt − 1
1− σ + βUt+1
where σ is the constant-relative-risk-aversion parameter and β is the subjective
discount rate. The household’s budget constraint is
ct +Bt ≤ (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 +
∫ 1
0
nfitwfit df + b(1− nt) + Πt − Tt
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where rt−1 is the (real) interest rate between period t− 1 and t, Bt−1 is holdings of
one-period real bonds, wfit is the wage rate in firm f in sector i, and Πt denotes
aggregate dividends from the firms. In addition, b is unemployment benefit measured
in consumption units and T denotes taxes. The representative household maximises
its utility subject to the budget constraint. The first order condition of this problem
is given by
1 = βEt{(1 + rt)c
−σ
t+1
c−σt
} (1.9)
Since the probability to find a job is p(θt), the household’s employment in firm
f in sector i evolves according to
nfit = (1− λ)nfit−1 + p(θt)vfit
vt
ut (1.10)
where p(θt)vfit/vt is the probability of finding a job at firm f in sector i.
We define JWfit(wfit) as the workers’ surplus from a job, i.e., the marginal value of
additional employment in firm f in sector i to the household in consumption units.
This is given by
JWfit(wfit) = wfit − b− Etβt,t+1{p(θt+1)JWxt+1 − (1− λ)JWfit+1(wfit+1)} (1.11)
where
JWxt+1 ≡
∫ 1
0
vjit+1
vt+1
JWjit+1(wjit+1) dj
denotes the economy-wide average surplus of a worker who is newly hired in time
t+ 1. βt,t+k ≡ βc−σt+k/c−σt is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and t+ k.
The last two terms in Equation (1.11) come from Equation (1.10) and reflect the fact
that an additional unit of employment at firm f results in 1 − λ unit of surviving
match at the firm in the next period but that this comes at a cost for workers.
Workers lose opportunities to find jobs elsewhere in the economy in the next period,
as workers who are employed cannot search for jobs in the next period.
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1.2.4 Government and market clearing
The resource constraint is given by
yt = ct +
κ
2
∫ 1
0
x2fitnfit−1 df (1.12)
The government budget constraint is
b(1− nt) = Tt (1.13)
The equation is based on the assumption that the government finances unemploy-
ment benefits with taxes.
1.2.5 Staggered wage bargaining in sector i
In this section, we describe the wage bargaining in the MC and the GTE models.
In both models, in each sector i, only a fraction of firms negotiate their wages with
their workers in each period. Newly hired workers are assumed to receive the same
wage with the existing workers if they enter the firm between the contracts. When
negotiating their wages, workers and firms take into account the fact that the wage
set is going to be valid for some time. We begin by describing the standard search
and matching with flexible wages and, then, present MC and GTE models.
Equilibrium wages with flexible wage bargaining
We denote the wage in sector i by wit2. Firm and worker surpluses, JFit (wit) and
JWit (wit), are given by
JFit (wit) = At − wit + Etβt,t+1{
κ
2
x2it+1(wit+1) + (1− λ)JFit+1(wit+1)} (1.14)
JWit (wit) = wit − b− Etβt,t+1{p(θt+1)JWxt+1 − (1− λ)JWit+1(wit+1)} (1.15)
2Since all renegotiating firms in a given sector set the same wage, we drop the subscript f from
now on. Note that, under flexible bargaining, all wages across sectors are the same, and therefore
we do not need the sector subscript i either. We maintain it for comparison with the MC and the
GTE.
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The Nash bargaining involves choosing the wage rate wit that maximises the
product of worker and firm surpluses. The resulting sharing rule is
JWit (wit) = η{JWit (wit) + JFit (wit)} (1.16)
where η ∈ (0, 1) denotes workers’ bargaining power. When we apply the sharing rule
(Equation (1.16)) to the firm and worker surpluses (Equations (1.14) and (1.15)),
we obtain the following expression for wages.
wit = w
FLEX
it (1.17)
where
wFLEXit = η(At + Etβt,t+1
κ
2
x2it+1) + (1− η){b+ Etβt,t+1p(θt+1)JWxt+1} (1.18)
wFLEXit denotes the wage rate that resulted from the Nash bargaining problem when
wages are fully flexible. As in the standard search and matching model, Equation
(1.18) implies that flex wage is a weighted average of the workers’ contribution to
the match and the workers’ opportunity costs.
The wage bargaining in the MC model
In the MC model, a random fraction 1− δi of firms in sector i resets the wage rate
with workers. We denote the reset wage in sector i by w∗it. Then, the firm surplus
of the resetting firm in sector i can be rewritten as
JFit (w
∗
it) = At − w∗it + Etβt,t+1{δi
κ
2
x2it+1(w
∗
it) + (1− δi)
κ
2
x2it+1(w
∗
it+1)}
+(1− λ)Etβt,t+1{δiJFit+1(w∗it) + (1− δi)JFit+1(w∗it+1)} (1.19)
Equation (1.19) adjusts (1.14) to reflect the possibility that the wages will remain
fixed with probability δi, and, therefore, the hiring rate and the firm surplus will be
different from those of the resetting firms in the next period.
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Similarly the worker’s surplus from the match can be expressed as
JWit (w
∗
it) = w
∗
it − {b+ Etp(θt+1)βt,t+1JWxt+1}
+(1− λ)Etβt,t+1{δiJWit+1(w∗it) + (1− δi)JWit+1(w∗it+1)} (1.20)
The sharing rule is given by Equation (1.16)3. When we apply the sharing rule
(Equation (1.16)) to the firm and worker surpluses (Equations (1.19) and (1.20)),
we obtain the following expressions for reset wages.
w∗it = Et
∞∑
k=0
ψMCi,k w
FLEX
it+k (1.21)
where
ψMCi,k ≡
{β(1− λ)δi}kΛt,t+k∑∞
j=0{β(1− λ)δi}jΛt,t+j
(1.22)
and Λt,t+k ≡ c−σt+k/c−σt . This equation indicates that reset wages are a weighted
average of current and future flex wages during the expected wage spell, discounted
by the survival probability of wage (δi), along with the survival probability of job
(1− λ) and the subjective discount factor (β).
The average wage (wit) in sector i is given by
wit =
∞∑
k=0
φMCi,k w
∗
it−k (1.23)
where
φMCi,k = (1− δi)δki (1.24)
Equation (1.23) shows that average wage is a weighted average of current and past
reset wages.
3Following Thomas (2008), we exclude the horizon effect, which results from the fact that
workers and firms have different horizons when negotiating wages. A firm takes into account the
fact that new hires will receive the same wage too. On the other hand, for workers, the current
wage rate is only relevant during the time they work for the firm. Gertler and Trigari (2009)
report that, this effect is not significant. Therefore, for simplicity but without loss of significant
generality, we ignore this effect.
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The wage bargaining in the GTE
In the GTE model, a fraction 1/i of firms in sector i resets the wage rate. This wage
will remain effective for and only for i periods. The firm surplus of the resetting
firm in sector i can be rewritten as
JFit (w
∗
it)=Et
i−1∑
k=0
{(1− λ)β}kΛt,t+k{At+k − w∗it + βt+k,t+k+1
κ
2
x2it+k+1(w
∗
it)}
+Et{(1− λ)β}iΛt,t+iJFit+i(w∗it+i) (1.25)
Similarly the worker surplus in the resetting firm in sector i is rewritten as
JWit (w
∗
it)=Et
i−1∑
k=0
{(1− λ)β}kΛt,t+k
[
w∗it − {b+ βt+k,t+k+1p(θ)t+k+1JWxt+k+1}
]
+Et{(1− λ)β}iΛt,t+iJWit+i(w∗it+i) (1.26)
Applying the sharing rule (Equation (1.16)) to firm and worker surpluses (Equa-
tions (1.25) and (1.26)) obtains the following expressions for reset wages.
w∗it = Et
i−1∑
k=0
ψGTEi,k w
FLEX
it+k (1.27)
where
ψGTEi,k ≡
{β(1− λ)}kΛt,t+k∑i−1
j=0{β(1− λ)}jΛt,t+j
(1.28)
As before, reset wage in the GTE is a weighted average of current and expected
future flex wages during the contract length. Since there is no uncertainty about
the opportunity of wage-renegotiation, the future flex wages are not discounted by
the hazard rate (δi) as in the MC case.
Finally, the average wage in sector i evolves according to
wit =
i−1∑
k=0
φGTEi,k w
∗
it−k (1.29)
where
φGTEi,k =
1
i
(1.30)
As in the MC, average wages are a weighted average of all ongoing wages.
29
1.3 The log-linearised economy
In this section, we present the complete set of log-linearised equilibrium conditions.
The steady-state of the model economy is presented in the Appendix. Variables
with a hat are log deviations from the steady-state value and variables with a tilde
the steady-state values. We begin by presenting the key equations describing wage
dynamics and job creation. By log-linearising Equations (1.21) and (1.27), we obtain
the following expressions for the reset wages in sector i
wˆ∗it =
S∑
k=0
ψi,kwˆ
FLEX
it+k

MC: S =∞
GTE: S = i− 1
(1.31)
where ψi,k is given by the steady-state values of Equations (1.22) in the MC and
(1.28) in the GTE, i.e. with Λ˜t,t+k = 1. The log-linearised flex wage in sector i in
case of the flexible wage bargaining (Equation (1.18)) is
wˆFLEXit = η(ϕaaˆt + ϕxEtxˆit+1) + ϕΛΛˆt,t+1
+(1− η)ϕθEt{(1− µ)θˆt+1 + JˆWxt+1} (1.32)
where ϕa ≡ A˜/w˜, ϕx ≡ βκx˜2/(w˜), ϕθ ≡ p(θ˜)βJ˜W/w˜, and ϕΛ ≡ ηϕx/2 + (1 − η)ϕθ. The
log-linearised average wage in sector i (Equations (1.23) and (1.29)) is
wˆit =
S∑
k=0
φi,kwˆ
∗
it−k

MC: S =∞
GTE: S = i− 1
(1.33)
where φi,k is given by Equations (1.24) in the MC and (1.30) in the GTE.
Next, when we log-linearise the job creation condition (Equation (1.6)), we obtain
the hiring rate in sector i
xˆit = κaaˆt − κwwˆit + κΛEtΛˆt,t+1 + βEtxˆit+1 (1.34)
where κa ≡ A˜/J˜F , κw ≡ w˜/J˜F and κΛ ≡ β(1 − λ/2). Iterating this equation forward
suggests that the hiring rate depends on the current and future productivity net of
wage. Note that due to long-term nature of contracts, firms consider not only current
wage and productivity, but the expected present value of wages and productivity.
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Log-linearsing unemployment (ut = 1−nt−1), labour market tightness (θt = vt/ut)
and the sector-i hiring rate (xit = q(θt)vit/nit−1) gives
uˆt = −p(θ˜)
λ
nˆt−1 (1.35)
θˆt = vˆt − uˆt (1.36)
xˆit = −µθˆt + vˆit − nˆit−1 (1.37)
Employment in sector i (Equation (1.4)) is log-linearised as
nˆit = nˆit−1 + λxˆit (1.38)
Aggregating individual firm’s production function (Equation (1.2)) across firms
in sector i and then log-linearising the resulting equation yield the sectoral output.
yˆit = aˆt + nˆit (1.39)
The log-linearised version of the Euler equation (Equation (1.9)) is given by
σ(cˆt − Etcˆt+1) + Etrt+1 = 0 (1.40)
As noted above (Equation (1.3)), the productivity shock follows an AR(1) process.
aˆt = ρaaˆt−1 + at (1.41)
Finally, we aggregate sectoral output, wage, employment, vacancy, and hiring rate
to obtain economy-wide output (yˆt), wage (wˆt), employment (nˆt), vacancy (vˆt), and
hiring rate (xˆt). For a variable zt, the economy-wide aggregate zˆt is given by a
weighted average of sectoral aggregate zˆit with the sector share αi as the weights as
shown by the following equation.
zˆt =
N∑
i=1
αizˆit (1.42)
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The resource constraint closes the model.
yˆt = y˜ccˆt + (1− y˜c) (2xˆt + nˆt−1) (1.43)
where y˜c ≡ c˜/y˜ denotes consumption share in output.
1.3.1 Calibration
We begin with the distribution of wage stickiness. We calibrate the distribution
of contract durations in our model using data compiled by Barattieri, Basu, and
Gottschalk (2014). Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014) provide evidence for the
distribution of wage spells using the Survey of Income and Program Participation
conducted by the US Census Bureau. The data are for the period from 1996 to
2000. The distribution of wage spells is reported in Figure 1.1. It is clear that there
are some flexible-wage contracts and at the same time, that the wage distribution
has a long tail. The interviews for the survey are conducted every 4 months and the
wage spell distribution is reported on the same basis. Therefore we use quarterly
calibration to minimise potential bias from using higher-frequency calibration.
To be more specific, the distribution reported in Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk
(2014) is an age distribution in the sense that it includes both complete and incom-
plete durations. As it is common in the literature, we assume that the probability of
a wage change is constant and interpret the statistics reported by Barattieri, Basu,
and Gottschalk (2014) as Calvo reset probabilities. We then use them to calibrate
the MC. The mean hazard rate is 0.18. We use this number to calibrate the Calvo
model. To calibrate the GTE we generate the distribution of completed durations
within each sector, and aggregate across sectors to obtain the distribution in the
economy as suggested by Dixon and Kara (2006). Finally, for computational pur-
pose we truncate the GTE at N = 36 quarters. The proportion of contracts that
last longer than 36 quarters is less than 4% 4. The mean completed contract lengths
is 10 quarters. We use this value to calibrate the simple Taylor model.
4Increasing the truncation point to 48 quarters reduces the proportion to less than 2%, but our
main conclusion appears robust.
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Next we present parameters that are common, which are standard (see, for ex-
ample, Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Krause and Lubik (2007)). The discount
factor is set to β = 0.99, the persistence parameter of the productivity shock is
set to ρz = 0.95 and the constant-relative-risk-aversion parameter is assumed to be
σ = 1. These are all standard values in the RBC literature.
Turning to the parameter values that are specific to the search and matching
model, the separation rate is calibrated at λ = 0.10, which is based on the evidence
that jobs last about two years and a half. We set the steady-state unemployment
rate to u˜ = 0.12. This is to allow for the potential job seekers such as discouraged
workers, since our model does not include the labour-market participation decision.
The implied job finding rate is p(θ˜) = 0.73. Following Krause and Lubik (2007)
and Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), we set the firm’s vacancy-filling rate
to q(θ˜) = 0.7. The matching elasticity is calibrated at µ = 0.5, while workers’
bargaining power is set to η = 0.5. The unemployment benefit ratio b˜ is the ratio of
the unemployment flow value (b) to the steady-state flow contribution of the worker
to the match (A˜ + κ/2x˜2). κ is the hiring cost parameter. κ and b are chosen in a
way so that b˜ is equal to 0.4. This requires setting κ = 6.56 and b = 0.41. The
implied replacement ratio is b/w˜ = 0.43 and the steady-state hiring costs to output
ratio is κ
2
x˜2 n˜
y˜
= 0.035.
Finally, we check the robustness of our results to the changes in key parameter
values: the steady-state job finding rate (p(θ˜)) and the unemployment benefit ratio
(b˜). Our benchmark value for p(θ˜) is at the middle of the values used in related
literature. For example, Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008) use 0.95 while Den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (2000) use 0.45. For b˜, we use the value used in Gertler and
Trigari (2009) and Shimer (2005). But Hall (2008) suggests 0.7, based on a broader
definition of b˜ as including utility from leisure. Therefore, we test the values of p(θ˜)
between 0.45 and 0.95, and b˜ between 0.4 and 0.7. Our main conclusions do not
change significantly.
5This value is higher than that assumed in Gertler and Trigari (2009). This is because in their
model production function consists of both capital and labour. In our model labour is the only
input. We can adjust b˜ to calibrate κ2 x˜
2 n˜
y˜ = 0.01, as in Gertler and Trigari (2009). Our main
conclusions are robust.
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Table 1.1: Calibration
Subjective discount factor β 0.99
Productivity autoregressive parameter ρa 0.95
Productivity standard deviation σa 0.0075
Separation rate λ 0.10
Elasticity of matching to unemployment µ 0.5
Worker’s bargaining power η 0.5
Unemployment rate u˜ 0.12
Unemployment flow value b 0.4081
Labour adjustment cost parameter κ 6.56
Note: Parameters in the rows 1-7 are fix. The rest of the parameters, i.e. the unemploy-
ment flow value (b) and the labour adjustment cost parameter (κ) are implied.
1.4 The volatility in labour market variables and
the cyclicality of wages
In this section, we evaluate the potential of our model in matching the volatility of
labour market variables and the cyclicality of wages. Table 1.2 reports the simulated
moments of labour market variables and output from our models along with the
corresponding moments from the US data. The data are taken from Gertler and
Trigari (2009) and for the periods between 1964:Q1 and 2005:Q1. Table 1.3 reports
the semi-elasticity of wages to unemployment from our model simulation and from
the US data. The data are taken from Haefke, Sonntag, and Van Rens (2013). Panel
A of Table 1.2 and the first row of Table 1.3 report the US data. The volatilities of
unemployment, vacancy, and labour market tightness are significantly greater than
that of output6, and therefore the volatilities of those variables relative to output
are 5.15, 6.30, and 11.28, respectively. The point-estimates for the semi-elasticity of
wage to unemployment range between -1.0 and -1.5.
6As in Gertler and Trigari (2009), the standard deviations of variables are expressed relative to
the standard deviation of output.
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Before reporting statistics from the models with wage stickiness, it is useful
to discuss the special case of our model when wages are fully flexible, as in the
standard search and matching model. The statistics from the flexible-wage version
of the model are reported in Panel B of Table 1.2 and in the second row of Table
1.3. Consistent with the findings reported in Shimer (2005), when wages are flexible,
the model cannot generate enough (relative) volatility in labour market dynamics
to match the data. The volatility of unemployment in the model is only 1.04, while
it is 5.15 in the data. The volatility of vacancy implied by the model is much lower
than that in the data (1.54 in the model vs. 6.30 in the data). This is also true for
the labour market tightness (2.40 in the model vs. 11.28 in the data). On the other
hand, the semi-elasticity of wage is higher than the point estimates (-3.5 vs. -1.0 –
-1.5).
Panels C of Table 1.2 and the third and the fourth rows of Table 1.3 report
statistics from the models with sticky wages and without heterogeneity: the Calvo
and the Taylor models. As is evident, both models come closer in matching the
volatility of labour market variables. In the Calvo model, the volatilities of unem-
ployment, vacancy, and tightness are 3.92, 5.71, and 9.04, compared to 1.04, 1.54,
and 2.40 in the standard search and matching model. In the simple Taylor model,
these are 4.01, 5.95, and 9.28. However, increased volatility comes at a significant
cost. The wage cyclicality implied by the model is too low, compared to the data.
The semi-elasticity of wage to unemployment is -0.38 in the simple Taylor model
and is only slightly higher in the Calvo model at -0.53.
We now turn to the models with heterogeneity: the MC and the GTE models.
Panels E and F of Table 1.2 and the fifth and the sixth rows of Table 1.3 report
the statistics for the models. In the MC model, the volatilities of unemployment,
vacancy, and tightness are 3.58, 5.26, and 8.27, respectively. In the GTE, those are
3.43, 5.09, and 7.94. These numbers suggest that the models with heterogeneity
generate similar volatilities in labour market variables as the models without. On
the other hand, the MC and the GTE generate significantly higher wage elasticity
than the Calvo and the Taylor models. The semi-elasticity of wage to unemployment
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of the GTE is -0.80. The semi-elasticity of wage of the MC is -0.70.
Finally, it is useful to note that all models generate more or less the same degree
of persistence in labour market variables, as measured by first autocorrelations. The
autocorrelations are reported in the second row of each panel. In, for example, the
GTE, the autocorrelations of unemployment, vacancy, and tightness are 0.93, 0.84,
and 0.92, while they are 0.93, 0.86, and 0.92 in the simple Taylor, compared to 0.91,
0.91, and 0.91 in the US data.
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Table 1.2: Main statistics
y w n u v θ
A. U.S. Economy, 1964:1-2005:1
Relative s.d. 1.00 0.52 0.60 5.15 6.30 11.28
Autocorrelation 0.87 0.91 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.91
B. Standard search and matching (Flexible wages)
Relative s.d. 1.00 0.84 0.14 1.04 1.54 2.40
Autocorrelation 0.74 0.74 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.92
C. Calvo
Relative s.d. 1.00 0.31 0.53 3.92 5.71 9.04
Autocorrelation 0.85 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.87 0.93
D. Simple Taylor
Relative s.d. 1.00 0.35 0.55 4.01 5.95 9.28
Autocorrelation 0.85 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.86 0.92
E. MC
Relative s.d. 1.00 0.33 0.49 3.58 5.26 8.27
Autocorrelation 0.84 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.85 0.92
F. GTE
Relative s.d. 1.00 0.35 0.47 3.43 5.09 7.94
Autocorrelation 0.83 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.92
Note: Panel A reports the statistics for the U.S. economy for the periods between 1964:Q1-
2005:Q1, which are taken from Gertler and Trigari (2009). Panels B-F report the statistics
for models that are computed by simulating the model 500 times for 300 periods conditional
on productivity shock. Changes in the number of simulations do not change the results. The
statistics are averages over the HP-filtered simulations with smoothing parameter 1, 600. The
standard deviations (s.d.) of all variables are relative to output.
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Table 1.3: Semi-elasticity of wage to unemployment
Semi-elasticity
US data -1 – -1.5
Model
Flexible wages -3.50
Calvo -0.53
Simple Taylor -0.38
MC -0.70
GTE -0.80
Note: The US data is taken from Haefke, Sonntag, and
Van Rens (2013).
1.5 How does the heterogeneity generate higher
wage elasticity?
The results in the previous section suggest that the models with heterogeneity come
closer in matching both the volatilities of labour market variables and the elasticity
of wages in the data than the models without. In this section, we explain the
intuition behind these results. There are two reasons why the MC and the GTE
perform better. The first reason is the presence of flexible wages in the model. The
second reason is the long-term nature of employment contracts. We will explain
each reason in turn.
1.5.1 High cyclicality of wages and the flexible-wage sector
The reason why wages are more responsive to shocks in the models with heterogene-
ity is the presence of flexible wages. In models with heterogeneity, the fraction of
firms that reset wages in a given period t is always greater than that in the models
without. Therefore in the models with heterogeneity, average wage is more respon-
sive to shocks than in the corresponding models without heterogeneity, resulting in
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a larger wage elasticity.
To compare the fraction of firms that reset the wage rate in a given period t
in different models, recall that it is given by a strictly convex function f(x) = 1/x,
where x is the contract duration T in the simple Taylor and the age of contract A
in the Calvo model. The fraction is given by
∑N
i=1 αif(xi) in the GTE and the MC,
where xi is the contract duration in sector i, Ti in the GTE, and the age in sector
i, Ai in the MC. In both cases,
∑N
i=1 αixi = x. Therefore, by Jensen’s inequality,∑N
i=1 αif(xi) > f(x). The fraction of resetting firms in the model with heterogeneity
is always greater than that in the models without. Average wage in the GTE and
the MC is more responsive to shocks than the corresponding simple Taylor and the
Calvo model in the initial periods, resulting in a larger wage elasticity.
1.5.2 Long-term employment contract, wage elasticity, and
labour market volatility
To understand why the models with and without heterogeneity generate similar
volatility of labour market variables, it is useful to consider the aggregate job creation
conditions in the models. If we aggregate Equation (1.34) across sectors, and then
iterate the equation forward, we obtain the following aggregate hiring rate.
xˆt = Et
∞∑
k=0
βk{κaaˆt+k − κwwˆt+k + κΛΛˆt,t+k} (1.44)
This equation illustrates a well-known implication of the search and matching frame-
work for job creation: firms’ hiring decision depends on the expected present value
of productivity and wages rather than current wages, as is pointed out by, for exam-
ple, Haefke, Sonntag, and Van Rens (2013). The reason why firms consider future
wages when they create a job is because of the long-term nature of employment con-
tracts. Since firms and workers maintain employment relationship until the match
is terminated, if future wages are high (low), the present value of the profits from
the job are expected to be low (high), leading to smaller (greater) job creation. As
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a result of the long-term contracts, wages in the far future7 are important for job
creation, as much as the current wages.
An important implication of Equation (1.44) is that we need to examine the entire
path of wage response to productivity shocks to see the effects of heterogeneity on
volatilities of labour market variables. Figure 1.2 plots the IRF of average wages to
the productivity shock in the GTE and in the simple Taylor model. In the GTE,
while average wage responds more to productivity shocks in the initial part of the
wage adjustment process, the later part is dominated by longer-term wage contracts.
Therefore, some time after the shock, wage adjustment in the GTE slows down. In
the simple Taylor model, although the initial adjustment in wages is slow due to
reason explained in the previous subsection, the renewal of all wages are completed
earlier than in the GTE. This is because there are less longer-term wage contracts in
the simple Taylor model. Therefore the peak wage level in the simple Taylor model
is higher than that in the GTE. After that, the only deviation from the steady-state
wages will be generated by what remains in the highly persistent productivity shock
process. The same mechanism holds true in the MC and the Calvo models case.
Overall, Figure 1.2 suggests that the heterogeneity in wage stickiness, or more
broadly, the way the wage stickiness is modelled can significantly change the shape
of the wage path, but not the present value of current and future wages. As a result,
job creation, and therefore the volatilities of labour market variables are more or
less the same across alternative models, while the elasticities are quite different.
1.6 Bargaining set
In this section we show that our model is not subject to the criticism by Barro
(1977). If a wage rate is set for a very long time, then, after some time, it may
fall out of the bargaining set. This implies that some wages are so outdated that
they do not reflect the current economic conditions. If this happens, either firms or
workers may find it inefficient to maintain the labour contracts, since the wage rate
7Note that future wages are discounted by β, which means even distant future wages are given
considerable weights.
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Figure 1.2: Impulse Response Functions of average wage to productivity shock
Note: The figure reports the IRF of average wage to productivity shock in the GTE and in the
corresponding simple Taylor model.
is less than their opportunity costs. The lower bound of the bargaining set is given
by the reservation wage of workers (rWfit), while the upper bound is determined by
the maximum wage the firm is willing to pay (rFfit). In particular, the bargaining
set is given by
Bfit = [r
W
fit, r
F
fit]
where rWfit is the wage at which the worker surplus from the job is zero,
JWfit = r
W
fit − b− Etβt,t+1{p(θt+1)JWxt+1 − (1− λ)JWfit+1} = 0
and rFfit is the wage that makes the firm surplus from the job zero.
JFfit = At − rFfit + Etβt,t+1{
κ
2
x2fit+1 + (1− λ)JFfit+1} = 0
We test if contract wages stay within the bargaining set over the life of the
contract. To check this, 1,000 observations of the model economy are simulated.
Productivity shocks are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. We
draw on standard values from the real business cycle literature and set the standard
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deviation of the shock to 0.0075. This is also the value used in Gertler and Trigari
(2009). For each τ -quarter-old wage, we compute the corresponding bargaining set
and examine if the wage rate gets outside of the bargaining set. We then aggregate
the fraction of contracts that can become inefficient, considering the share of the
wage contracts in the economy. Our results show that about 95% of wage contracts
remain efficient in the MC model and the GTE. All contracts are efficient in the
simple Taylor model and the Calvo model.
1.7 Summary and Conclusions
We have extended the staggered multi-period wage contracting model of Gertler
and Trigari (2009), which is based on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP)
framework to include many sectors, each with different degree of wage stickiness.
Within each sector, there is a more or less standard search and matching process.
When all sectors have the same degree of wage stickiness, the model reduces to the
Gertler and Trigari (2009). Assuming in all sectors wages adjust every period gives
the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model.
Our main finding is that models that account for heterogeneity in wage stickiness
suggested by micro-evidence on wages come closer in matching both the volatility of
labour market variables and the cyclicality of wages. We consider several different
approaches in modelling wage stickiness. Results suggest that so long as there is
some degree of wage stickiness, the model matches the volatility of labour market
variables. However, only models with heterogeneity in wage stickiness can match
both the volatility of labour market variables and the cyclicality of wages. The
presence of flexible wages in the economy means that such wages respond a lot to
shocks, making aggregate wages more responsive to shocks. The presence of sticky
wages means that it takes time for aggregate wages to adjust to shocks fully. Lower
wages increase volatility in the labour market.
Heterogeneity in wage stickiness can offer a solution to the unemployment volatil-
ity puzzle and suggests a way forward in terms of how wages should be modelled in
search and matching models.
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Chapter 2
Interactions
between flexible prices and sticky prices
lead to a hump-shaped output response
to monetary policy
2.1 Introduction
The New Keynesian literature has struggled to come up with models that generate
a hump-shaped output response to monetary policy shocks. While empirical studies
show that monetary policy shocks lead to a hump-shaped response in output (see,
for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)), the standard simple New
Keynesian model fails to generate a hump-shaped response. It has been difficult
to identify mechanisms that can generate such a response. A common device to
overcome this shortcoming of the model is to introduce habit persistence in con-
sumption to the model (see, for example, Smets and Wouters (2007)). Doing so
introduces inertia into an otherwise completely forward-looking model. If the de-
gree of habit persistence is sufficiently large, the model generates a hump-shaped
response in output in response to monetary policy shocks.
In this chapter, we explore another possible explanation for a hump-shaped re-
sponse in output. We show that New Keynesian models that account for hetero-
geneity in price stickiness we have observed in the data can generate a hump-shaped
response in output to monetary policy shocks. In the multi-sector model, there are
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many sectors, each with a different contract length. We find that, when monetary
policy shocks are persistent, an interaction between sectors with flexible prices and
those with sticky prices leads to a hump-shaped output response.
Heterogeneity in price stickiness is an important feature of the micro-evidence
on prices (see Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)). Mod-
els that introduce this heterogeneity into New Keynesian models have been studied
extensively in the recent literature (see, for example, Carvalho (2006), Dixon and
Kara (2010), Dixon and Le Bihan (2012) and Kara (2015)). After reviewing these
models, Taylor (2016) concludes that “future research would likely yield large ben-
efits if it moved on from representative staggered wage and price setting models to
heterogeneous staggered wage and price setting models".
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to formalise the role of flexible
prices on output dynamics in such models and to show how the presence of flexible
prices can help the model generate a hump-shaped output response to monetary
policy shocks. The existing literature tends to focus on macroeconomic persistence
implications of these models.
Interestingly, our analysis reveals that adding flexible prices to an otherwise
standard New Keynesian model makes price-setting less forward-looking. Indeed,
using the undetermined coefficient method, we show that output in the multi-sector
model can be expressed as an autoregressive process, where output depends on its
own lag and monetary policy shocks. The lagged output term arises due to the
introduction of a flexible-price sector to the model. The coefficient of lagged output
depends on the share of the flexible-price sector and increases with the share of the
flexible-price sector. We find that, holding other factors constant, a higher share of
flexible prices leads to a larger hump. We further show that the Calvo model is a
special case of the multi-sector model when the share of the flexible-price sector is
zero and all the other sectors face the same degree of price stickiness. The Calvo
model cannot generate a hump, as output does not have a lag and solely depends
on the shock. This finding is consistent with that reported in Galí (2015, p. 64-66).
Due to the lack of backward-looking behaviour in price-setting, the model cannot
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generate a hump even when the shock is highly persistent.
To understand the reasons behind these results, first, note that sectors with
flexible prices respond more to shocks than the ones with sticky prices. Soon after
the shock, flexible-price firms realise that their prices are different from firms with
sticky prices. To preserve relative prices, flexible-price firms reduce their prices to
bring them in line with those in sticky-price sectors. As a consequence, inflation
in the flexible-price sector depends negatively on relative price in that sector in the
previous period. If relative price in that sector in the previous period is too high,
flexible-price firms cut their prices significantly. This behaviour makes price-setting
history dependent in the sense that inflation in the flexible-price sector and, in turn,
aggregate inflation depend on lagged relative prices. Relative prices are related to
output. Therefore, output in the previous period becomes relevant. This history
dependence, in the presence of persistent monetary policy shocks, leads to a hump-
shaped response in output.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
model and describes our calibration of the model. Section 3 solves the model using
the undetermined coefficient method. Section 4 reports impulse response functions
(IRF) of output from the version of the model calibrated based on the Bils and
Klenow (2004) dataset. Section 5 performs robustness checks. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2.2 The Multiple Calvo (MC) model
The model is the simplified version of that in Kara (2015) and incorporates hetero-
geneity in price stickiness into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model, using
the multiple Calvo approach. The economy consists of the following set of agents:
firms, households, and a monetary authority. As in the standard model, there is
a continuum of firms and households over the unit interval. Monopolistically com-
petitive firms, indexed by f ∈ [0, 1], produce differentiated goods and set prices
according to Calvo (1983) pricing. Households, indexed by h ∈ [0, 1], consume the
final consumption good and supply labour. Each household h is twinned with each
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firm f , which implies that the household h can only work for firm f . The unit
interval of firms and households are divided into sectors, indexed by i (= 1, ..., N).
In sector i, the hazard rate is given by 1 − δi and the share of each sector is given
by αi. A monetary authority sets nominal interest rate according to the Taylor
rule. Below, we list log-linearised equations of the model economy. All variables are
written as log-deviations from zero-inflation steady state. Let us start by describing
inflation dynamics in sector i:
piit = βEtpiit+1 + κiγyt − κipit (2.1)
where κi = (1−δi)(1−βδi)/δi. β is the subjective discount rate. γ shows the degree
of real price rigidity in the economy. piit denotes inflation in sector i and pit the
relative price in that sector. yt denotes aggregate output. The demand for firms’
output in sector i (yit) is given by
yit = −pit + yt (2.2)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between different goods. The following
equation relates sectoral inflation to aggregate inflation:
pit = pit−1 + piit − pit (2.3)
Since relative prices across sectors sum up to zero, we have
0 =
N∑
i=1
pit (2.4)
Aggregate output is given by the Euler equation
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) (2.5)
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where σ denotes the degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, the monetary authority
follows the simple Taylor rule, which is given by
it = φpipit + φyyt +mt (2.6)
where mt is a monetary policy shock and follows an AR(1) process.
mt = ρmmt−1 + t (2.7)
where t is an iid shock with zero mean.
2.2.1 Choice of Parameters
We describe our calibration of the model. The time period corresponds to a quarter.
The discount factor is set to β = 0.99 and the relative-risk-aversion parameter is
set to σ = 1. The coefficient on inflation in the Taylor rule is φpi = 1.5 and that on
output is φy = 0.125. The autoregressive parameter of the monetary shock is set
to ρm = 0.9. The elasticity of substitution between different goods is  = 6. The
elasticity of labour supply is assumed to be 1. With these assumptions, the implied
elasticity of the marginal costs to output is γ = 0.3. These are all standard values
in the literature (see Ascari (2000) and Woodford (2003)). In Section 5, we report
robustness checks that test the sensitivity of main conclusions to different parameter
values. Finally, the frequency of price adjustment is calibrated based on the dataset
provided by Bils and Klenow (2004). The mean age of contracts is 2.4 quarters;
δ = 1− 1/2.4, which is used to calibrate the Calvo model.
2.3 A hump in output in the MC
In this section, using the undetermined coefficient method, we analytically show
that the MC has a potential to generate a hump-shaped output response to mon-
etary policy shocks. Before proceeding to our analysis, we make two simplifying
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assumptions throughout Section 3. First, β = 1, φy = 01. Second, we focus on a
special MC with two sectors. In sector 1, prices are perfectly flexible, while they
are sticky in sector 2. Given that prices adjust every period in sector 1, inflation in
this sector does not have a Phillips curve representation. The relative price in this
sector is given by
p1t = γyt (2.8)
Using this equation along with Equation (2.3), inflation in sector 1 can be ex-
pressed as
pi1t = γ(yt − yt−1) + pit (2.9)
Inflation in sector 2 is given by Equation (2.1)
pi2t = Etpi2t+1 + κ2γyt − κ2p2t (2.10)
Substituting Equation (2.9) into pit = α1pi1t + α2pi2t gives aggregate inflation in
the MC.
pit = pi2t +
α1
α2
γ (yt − yt−1) (2.11)
As this equation clearly shows inflation is less forward-looking than that in the
Calvo model. This equation gives inflation in the Calvo model when α1 = 0. When
α1 = 0, the second term on the RHS disappears, resulting in a purely forward-
looking equation. In the MC, inflation depends on the growth rate of output and,
therefore lagged output. By combining Equations (2.4), (2.8), (2.10), and (2.11), we
obtain the Phillips curve for this economy, which is given by
pit = Etpit+1 − α1
α2
γEtyt+1 + {2α1
α2
+ κ2(1 +
α1
α2
)}γyt − α1
α2
γyt−1 (2.12)
Finally, combining this equation with the Euler equation (Equation (2.5)), the
Taylor rule (Equation (2.6)), and the monetary shock process (Equation (2.7)), we
1We numerically test our results with more realistic values for these parameters (β = 0.99,
φy = 0.125). Our results do not change significantly.
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express output in terms of its own lag, leads, and the shock2
yt = τ1yt−1 + τ2Etyt+1 + τ3Etyt+2 + τ4mt (2.13)
where τ1 = φpi
α1
α2
γ/τ¯1
τ2 = (2 + φpi
α1
α2
γ + τ¯2)/τ¯1
τ3 = −(1 + α1
α2
γ)/τ¯1
τ4 = −(1− ρm)/τ¯1
τ¯1 = 1 + φpi τ¯2 +
α1
α2
γ
τ¯2 = {κ2 + (2 + κ2)α1
α2
}γ
The coefficient on lagged output depends on the relative share of the flexible-price
sector (α1/α2), the coefficient on inflation in the Taylor rule (φpi), nominal rigidity
(κ2) and real rigidity (γ) parameters. When α1 = 0, τ1 = 0. This equation gives the
output dynamics in the standard Calvo model. We solve the model by employing
the undetermined coefficient method, which involves guessing the general functional
form of the solution and then using the model to determine the coefficients. We
guess that yt is a linear function of yt−1 and mt
yt = χyyt−1 + χmmt (2.14)
The coefficients on Equation (2.14) are given by the following system of equa-
tions.
τ3χ
3
y + τ2χ
2
y − χy + τ1 = 0 (2.15)
χm(τ3χ
2
y + τ2χy + τ3ρmχy + τ2ρm + τ3ρ
2
m − 1) + τ4 = 0 (2.16)
Since the exact analytical results require to solve a cubic equation, we rely on
numerical simulations to study the effects of different parameters on output. Our
first result is that the model becomes more backward-looking, as the share of the
flexible-price sector increases in the economy. In the first panel of Figure 2.1, we plot
2See Appendix for a detailed derivation.
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the coefficient on lagged output (χy) against the flexible-price sector share (α1)3. As
it is evident from the figure, the coefficient on lagged output increases with the share
of the flexible-price sector. The second panel indicates that the absolute value of
the coefficient on the shock (χm) remains more or less the same when the flexible-
price sector share is between 0.01 and 0.4, and then decreases with the sector share.
Output responses become more persistent, as the flexible-price sector share increases,
since χy increases. An increased flexible-price sector share reduces the effect of the
shock on impact, since |χm| decreases.
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Figure 2.1: Flexible-price sector share and the coefficients on the output equation
Note: The first panel shows the coefficient on lagged output (χy) and the second panel shows the
coefficient on the shock (χm).
3Note that the value of χy does not depend on the value of ρm.
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Since output dynamics is determined by the coefficients χy and χm, we can derive
a condition for a hump in output in terms of these two coefficients. A hump-shaped
response requires that yt+1 > yt. From Equation (2.14), in period t, output is given
by yt = χmmt. In period t + 1, yt+1 = χyyt + χmmt+1. Using Equation (2.7) and
the fact that t+1 = 0, we obtain yt+1 = χyyt +χmρmmt. Given that yt = χmmt and
yt+1 = χyχmmt +χmρmmt, straightforward algebra gives the following condition for
a hump-shaped output response to monetary shocks:
χy > 1− ρm (2.17)
This condition suggests that if the shock process is sufficiently persistent, the
MC can generate a hump-shaped response. Figure 2.2 shows the minimum required
value of the shock persistence when we vary the share of the flexible-price sector. As
the figure shows, an increase in the flexible-price sector share reduces the need for
highly persistent monetary policy shock. For example, when α1 = 0.1, the degree of
persistence has to be 0.96. On the other hand, when the flexible-price sector share
is 0.5, it is lower at 0.69.
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Figure 2.2: Flexible-price sector share and the minimum shock persistence
Note: The minimum shock persistence required for an output hump is calculated using the condi-
tion χy > 1− ρm, for each value of the flexible-price sector share.
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Finally, when the flexible-price sector share is 0, the model becomes the Calvo
model. In this case, Equation (2.13) has no lagged output in it, and there is no
hump for any value of ρm. For 0 < ρm < 1, output increases on impact and then
monotonically goes back to the initial steady-state level. For ρm > 1 output increases
infinitely, leading to indeterminacy.
2.4 Impulse response functions of output
This section reports the IRFs of output in response to the monetary shock. We
report the IRFs from a 2-sector MC and from a more realistic version of the MC,
which uses the distribution of contract lengths provided by Bils and Klenow (2004)
(BK-MC). We begin with the 2-sector MC. Figure 2.3 shows the IRF of output to a
monetary policy shock from the MC for different shares of the flexible-price sector
(α1 = 0.3, α1 = 0.6, and α1 = 0.8), along with that from the Calvo model. The
results are consistent with those reported in the previous section. Two points should
be made. First, a hump in output becomes bigger as the share of the flexible-price
sector increases. Second, the initial response of output becomes more muted, as
the share increases. These two results reflect the fact that the coefficient on lagged
output (χy) becomes greater and that on the shock (χm) becomes smaller, as the
flexible-price sector share increases.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Response Functions to monetary policy shock in 2-sector MC
model
Note: The solid red line with circles denotes the IRF of output from the Calvo model. The solid
black line and the dashed green line denote the IRF from the 2-sector MC model when the flexible-
price sector share is 0.3 and 0.6, respectively. The solid blue line with diamonds denotes the IRF
from the 2-sector MC model when the flexible-price sector share is 0.8.
Next, in Figure 2.4, we report the IRF of output from the BK-MC model.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Functions to monetary policy shock in the BK-MC
model
Note: The dashed red line with circles denotes the IRF of output from the Calvo model. The solid
blue line with diamonds denotes the IRF from the BK-MC model.
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The figure also plots the IRF from the Calvo model. In the Calvo model, the
maximum effect of the shock is on impact and there is no hump. In contrast, the
BK-MC generates a hump-shaped response. These results suggest that our results
for the simplified MC hold true in the version of the model with a more realistic
distribution.
2.5 The role of different parameter values
Output dynamics in the MC depends on two key parameter values; the degree of
real rigidity (γ) and the coefficient on inflation in the Taylor rule (φpi), as is seen in
Equation (2.13). Therefore, we check the robustness of our conclusions for plausible
range of values of the two parameters. We perform these tests using a 2-sector MC.
We consider different calibrations and for each calibration, given the flexible-price
sector share, we calculate the minimum degree of monetary shock persistence needed
by the model to generate a hump-shaped output response. Figure 2.5 reports the
results from this experiment. The first panel reports four calibrations where we vary
the degree of real rigidities γ between 0.1 and 0.4. When γ is lower (e.g. γ = 0.2)
the MC requires more persistent shock to generate a hump. The second panel also
reports four calibrations where we vary the coefficient on inflation in the Taylor rule
(φpi) between 1.2 and 2.5. A stronger reaction by the central bank to inflation (e.g.,
φpi = 2.5) reduces the required degree of monetary shock persistence. However,
in all cases we consider in this section, the results are very similar to those in the
benchmark case.
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Figure 2.5: Flexible-price sector share and the minimum shock persistence, with
different calibrations
Note: The first panel reports the required degree of monetary shock persistence in the 2-sector
MC for different values of γ, which represents the degree of real rigidities. The second panel shows
the required degree of shock persistence for different values of φpi, which denotes the coefficient on
inflation in the Taylor rule. How to calculate the minimum shock persistence is described in the
notes of Figure 2.2.
2.6 Summary and Conclusions
We have proposed a solution to a long-standing challenge in macroeconomics –
namely that output follows a hump-shaped pattern in response to monetary policy
shocks. We have shown that a New Keynesian model that accounts for heterogeneity
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in price stickiness can generate a hump-shaped response in output when monetary
policy shocks are persistent. The presence of fully-flexible prices is the key for this
result. Such prices are more responsive to shocks than sticky prices. Prices in the
flexible-price sector are high, relative to those in sticky sectors when the shock hits
the economy. To bring their prices in line with those in sticky sectors, firms in
the flexible-price sector cut their prices soon after the shock. As result, inflation in
the flexible-price sector and, therefore, aggregate inflation depend on lagged relative
prices in a multi-sector model. This introduces inertia to price-setting. This inertia,
along with persistent monetary policy shocks, leads to a hump-shaped response in
output to monetary policy shocks.
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Chapter 3
Output dynamics in New Keynesian models
with search frictions
and heterogeneity in nominal rigidities
3.1 Introduction
Many empirical studies, e.g. Sims (1986), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996, 1999), estimate the quantitative effects of a
shock to monetary policy by using typically vector autoregressions. The consensus
from these studies is that a monetary policy shock leads to a hump-shaped response
in aggregate real quantities, including output. The peak effect of a shock on out-
put occurs not on impact of the shock, but several quarters after the shock. As
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2017) state, a common prescription to this
problem is to assume habit-formation in consumption. For example, widely-used
medium-sized New Keynesian business-cycle models such as Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) adopt this assumption.
Habit-formation generates inertia in the model that is required for hump-shaped
responses in real activities.
This chapter provides an alternative approach to the problem. We extend a
simple New Keynesian model with both price and wage stickiness by adding (i)
the search and matching frictions in the labour market as in Diamond (1982a,b),
Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985)1 and (ii) heterogeneity in nominal rigidi-
1See also Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
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ties. In this model, the interactions between our two extensions generate inertia in
output dynamics, which leads to a hump-shaped output response when a monetary
shock is persistent. In particular, we show that long-term employment relation-
ship that arises under the search and matching framework gives rise to the history
dependence in marginal costs: marginal costs depend on lagged output level. In
conjunction with heterogeneity in nominal rigidities, the search frictions produce
rich inflation and output dynamics in the model. By the method of undetermined
coefficients, it is revealed that output shows an inertial response in our model. That
is, output can be expressed as an autoregressive process, where it depends on its
own lags and a monetary shock process. We find that the coefficient on lagged out-
put increases with the degree of long-term employment relationship. Further, the
coefficient on lagged output increases faster with this long-term relationship, when
heterogeneity in nominal rigidity is stronger, and vice versa. This suggests that the
search frictions and heterogeneity in nominal rigidities reinforce each other to help
the model reproduce inertial output dynamics.
The key to our results is the role of long-term employment relationship, that
arises from the search and matching framework, for inflation and output dynamics.
Search and matching models explicitly stipulate that previously-employed workers
stay in the job for a long period of time. In a model with the standard labour
market, where hiring is costless, this would not matter. But with a costly and
time-consuming hiring process, the (partial) continuation of previously created job
matches implies that firms could save hiring costs in the current period thanks to
past hiring activities, and hence, with other things equal, marginal costs would be
lower if they hired more workers in the past. As a result, lagged employment, and
lagged output level affect marginal costs in the current period. To further illustrate
this point, suppose that there is a hike in hiring activity after an expansionary shock.
In the next period, many of the increased stock of workers will stay in the job unless
separated, and therefore the demand for new hires decreases substantially. This
means hiring costs, that constitute marginal costs together with wages, increase
steeply after an expansionary monetary shock, and then fall considerably. Inflation
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depends on marginal costs, and on lagged output level. Therefore previous path of
output becomes relevant. This history dependence results in inertia in the model,
leading to a hump-shaped output response when monetary shock is persistent.
This chapter is closely related to our second chapter, where we extend a sim-
ple New Keynesian DSGE model with the standard labour market by introducing
heterogeneity in price stickiness. In a model with multiple sectors, each with a
different degree of price stickiness, we show that the presence of the flexible-price
sector makes inflation history dependent and helps an otherwise standard model
replicate hump-shaped output responses to persistent monetary shocks. This chap-
ter shares the same goal, but does so in a richer environment. The departure is to
introduce two realistic assumptions into the model: nominal wage stickiness and the
search and matching frictions in the labour market. There is ample evidence that
wages are sticky, and it is common to assume wage stickiness in medium-sized New
Keynesian models as a device to reproduce large and persistent responses in real
activities to monetary shocks. In addition, we revisit the implications of the search
and matching framework in the labour market, which is a standard tool in current
macro-labour analysis, within the New Keynesian environment. It is revealing that
the model with heterogeneity in nominal rigidities and with the standard labour
market cannot generate a hump-shaped output response to monetary shocks when
wages are sticky, as shown in Section 4. We interpret this as suggesting the relevance
of the search frictions in the New Keynesian models.
This chapter is related to the literature that studies the role of the search frictions
in New Keynesian business cycle models. Walsh (2005) studies how the search
and matching frictions affect the real effects of monetary policy shocks. He finds
that the search frictions increase output responses relative to an otherwise similar
model with the standard labour market. Trigari (2009) reports similar findings. She
argues that the search frictions lower the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to
output, and this helps the model explain the persistent output response to monetary
shocks. In contrast, Krause and Lubik (2007) point out that the precise role of
the search frictions in Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2009) are difficult to assess, due
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to model assumptions other than search frictions such as habit formation. Based
on an analysis of a simple New Keynesian model with the search frictions, they
conclude that the search frictions per se do not affect the mechanism that generates
endogenous persistence in the model.
Another study that is closely related to ours is Ravenna and Walsh (2008).
They study the role of search frictions in the labour market for inflation. It is shown
that the lagged unemployment term appears in the Phillips curve due to the search
frictions. They also note that long-term employment relationship gives rise to the
backward-lookingness in inflation. We go one step further and show the link between
this backward-lookingness in inflation and output inertia, in the models with the
search frictions, with and without heterogeneity in nominal rigidities.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 provides our calibration. Section 4 presents the impulse response function
(IRF) of output to monetary shocks in our models. Section 5 uses the method of
undetermined coefficients to analytically show the role of the search frictions and
its interaction with heterogeneity in nominal rigidity, focusing on inertial output
responses. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Overview of the Economy
Our model builds on the RBC model with the search frictions in the labour market
and heterogeneity in wage stickiness, that we developed in the first chapter. We bring
the model into New Keynesian environment, and introduce heterogeneity in price
stickiness. Therefore our model features the search and matching frictions in the
labour market and heterogeneity in price and wage stickiness. The economy consists
of the following set of agents: retailers, firms, households, a monetary authority, and
the government. Note that we distinguish two types of firms: retailers and wholesale
firms, or simply firms. We do this to separate the staggered price setting from the
search and matching frictions and wage bargaining. This setup is widely used in New
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Keynesian models with the search frictions, e.g., Trigari (2009) and Walsh (2005)
as well as models with the standard labour market, e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007),
where the firms in our model correspond to the craft-unions in those models.
There is a continuum of firms and retailers over the unit interval. Monopolis-
tically competitive firms, indexed by f ∈ [0, 1], hire workers, subject to the search
frictions, to produce differentiated wholesale goods which are sold to retailers. Firms
set prices flexibly and Nash-bargain their wage rates with workers subject to Calvo
(1983) staggering. Monopolistically competitive retailers, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], sell
differentiated consumption goods to households, subject to price rigidity. The house-
holds consume final consumption goods and supply labour to firms. Each household
has a continuum of members, who can either be workers or unemployed. Firms are
divided into sectors with index i (= 1, ..., N) and with the shares αi. Retailers are
also divided into sectors with index k (= 1, ...,M) and with the shares αk. The
sectors are differentiated by their degree of wage stickiness in case of firms, and that
of price stickiness in case of retailers. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
degree of nominal rigidities increase with indices i and k. It is assumed that workers
can freely move from one sector to another to find a job when they are unemployed.
A monetary authority sets nominal interest rate according to a policy rule, subject
to shocks. The government pays unemployment benefit to households by raising
lump-sum taxes.
3.2.2 The labour market and the matching
The labour market structures and the search and matching process are standard2,
and the search and matching is done at the economy-wide level. Let nfit−1 be the
number of workers at firm f in sector i in period t−1. Each firm loses an exogenously
given fraction λ of workers in each period. At the same time, the firm posts vacancies
vfit to hire new workers. The aggregate vacancies (vt) and the unemployed workers
(ut) meet to produce successful matches3. The matching is given by the aggregate
matching functionm(ut, vt) ≡ µmuµt v1−µt , where µm is the scaling parameter. Labour
2See Pissarides (2000) for a textbook presentation of the model.
3vt ≡
∫ 1
0
vfit df and ut = 1− nt−1.
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market tightness is defined as θt ≡ vt/ut. We also define q(θt) as the vacancy-filling
rate and p(θt) as the job-finding rate. The vacancy posting comes at a flow cost κ
for the duration of the vacancy. We assume that new hires participate in production
immediately4.
3.2.3 Households
The household is characterized by the standard constant-relative-risk-aversion pref-
erence and a budget constraint. We follow Merz (1995) and assume that income is
pooled together within the representative household. Then the household’s optimi-
sation problem yields the Euler equation.
1 = βEt
[
(1 + it)
c−σt+1
c−σt
Pt
Pt+1
]
(3.1)
where σ denotes the constant-relative-risk-aversion parameter and β the subjective
discount rate. it is the nominal interest rate between period t and t + 1. The
final consumption good is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of differentiated retail goods;
ct =
(∫ 1
0
c
(p−1)/p
jkt dj
)p/(p−1)
, where p denotes the elasticity of substitution between
differentiated retail goods. The corresponding price index (Pt) is given by Pt =(∫ 1
0
P 1−
p
jkt dj
)1/(1−p)
, where Pjkt is the retailer j’s price. Then the demand for the
retailer j’s variety is given by
cjkt = (
Pjkt
Pt
)−
p
ct (3.2)
Additionally, we define JWfit(wfit) as the workers’ surplus from a job at firm f ,
i.e., the marginal value of an additional employment to the household.
JWfit(Wfit) =
Wfit
Pt
− b− Etβt,t+1
[
p(θt+1)J
W
xt+1 − (1− λ)JWfit+1(Wfit+1)
]
(3.3)
where JWxt+1 ≡
∫ 1
0
vqit+1
vt+1
JWqit+1(Wqit+1) dq denotes the average surplus of a worker who
is newly hired in time t + 1. βt,t+s ≡ βc−σt+s/c−σt is the stochastic discount factor
between periods t and t+ s.
4The same assumption is made in Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Gertler, Sala, and Trigari
(2008).
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3.2.4 Firms
Firms hire workers to produce differentiated wholesale goods. Let us denote the
output of the firm f in sector i by lfit. We assume the following constant-return-to-
scale production technology.
lfit = nfit (3.4)
Aggregate wholesale good lt is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of differentiated wholesale
goods; lt =
(∫ 1
0
l
(w−1)/w
fit df
)w/(w−1)
, where w denotes the elasticity of substitution
between differentiated wholesale goods. The corresponding wholesale price index
(Pwt ) is given by Pwt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−
w
fit df
)1/(1−w)
, where Pfit is the firm f ’s price. Then
the demand for firm f ’s variety is
lfit = (
Pfit
Pwt
)−
w
lt (3.5)
As explained above, the workforce of firm f in sector i consists of workers that
have been employed in the past and new hires.
nfit = (1− λ)nfit−1 + q(θt)vfit (3.6)
In each period, the firm maximises the following firm value subject to Equations
(3.4), (3.5), and (3.6), by choosing price (Pfit), employment (nfit), and vacancy
(vfit), taking as given the employment at the beginning of the period (nfit−1), the
labour market tightness (θt) and the current and expected path of wages (Wfit).
Ffit ≡ max
Pfit,nfit,vfit
Et
∞∑
s=0
βt,t+s
[
Pfit+s
Pt+s
lfit+s − Wfit+s
Pt+s
nfit+s − κvfit+s
]
(3.7)
The solution to this problem yields the job creation condition.
κ
q(θt)
= ϕfit − Wfit
Pt
+ (1− λ)Etβt,t+1 κ
q(θt+1)
(3.8)
ϕfit is the Lagrange multiplier on the output constraint. This implies the contribu-
tion of an additional unit of output to firm value, and therefore equals to firm’s real
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marginal costs. The firm’s pricing decision is given by
pfit ≡ Pfit
Pt
=
w
w − 1ϕfit (3.9)
That is, the firm adds a constant mark-up over marginal costs to set prices.
We define JFfit(Wfit) as the firm’s marginal surplus from a job when it hires an
additional worker at the wage rate Wfit. This is given by
JFfit(Wfit) = ϕfit −
Wfit
Pt
+ (1− λ)Etβt,t+1JFfit+1(Wfit+1) (3.10)
This implies that the firm’s surplus is equal to the sum of the net marginal revenue
in the current period and the continuation value of the match.
3.2.5 Wage bargaining
Wage rate is Nash bargained. Then the sharing rule is given by
JWfit(Wfit) = η
[
JWfit(Wfit) + J
F
fit(Wfit)
]
(3.11)
where η denotes the worker’s bargaining power5. In case of period-by-period wage
bargaining as in standard search and matching models, we obtain real wages (wt)
by substituting Equations (3.3) and (3.10) into (3.11)6.
wt = w
FLEX
t (3.12)
where
wFLEXt = ηϕt + (1− η){b+ Etβt,t+1p(θt+1)JWxt+1} (3.13)
We denote flex wages, i.e., the solution to the Nash bargaining problem when
wages are fully flexible, by wFLEXt . As in standard search and matching models,
Equation (3.13) implies that flex wage is a weighted average of the workers’ contri-
5As in Thomas (2008), we exclude the horizon effect, which results from the fact that workers
and firms have different horizons when negotiating wages. Gertler and Trigari (2009) report that
this effect is not significant.
6We drop the firm and the sector subscripts, since all firms set the same wage rates when all
wages are bargained each period.
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bution to the match and the workers’ opportunity costs.
In case of staggered wage bargaining, only a fraction 1 − δwi of firms in sector i
renegotiate nominal wages, denoted byW ∗it7, with workers in each period. We assume
that newly hired workers receive the same wage with the continuing workers if they
enter the firm between the contracts8. Therefore, when negotiating their wages,
workers and firms consider the fact that the wage is going to remain effective for
some time. We adjust the firm and the worker surpluses (Equation (3.10) and (3.3))
to reflect this fact by applying EtJit+1 = Et
[
δwi Jit+1(W
∗
it) + (1− δwi )Jit+1(W ∗it+1)
]
for both worker and firms surpluses, and substitute the resulting expressions into
Equation (3.11). This yields an expression for real reset wages w∗it in sector i.
w∗it =
∞∑
s=0
Etψi,sw
FLEX
it+s (3.14)
where
ψi,s ≡ {δ
w
i (1− λ)β}sΛt,t+s∑∞
q=0{δwi (1− λ)β}qΛt,t+q/Πt,t+q
(3.15)
and
Λt,t+s ≡ c−σt+s/c−σt , Πt,t+q ≡
Pt+1
Pt
Pt+2
Pt+1
· · · Pt+q
Pt+q−1
(3.16)
This equation implies that real reset wage is a weighted average of the current
and future flex wages over the expected life of contracts. Since firms consider the
cases when their wage rates remain effective in the future, they consider not only
current flex wages, but also future flex wages, discounted by the survival probability
of wage (δwi ), along with the survival probability of job (1 − λ) and the subjective
discount factor (β). They also consider the cumulative inflation (Πt,t+s), because
when nominal reset wages are once set, the real wage rate at future dates will fall
due to inflation.
Lastly, average nominal wage in sector i, denoted by Wit, is given by
Wit = δ
w
i Wit−1 + (1− δwi )W ∗it (3.17)
7Since all renegotiating firms in sector i set the same wage, we drop the subscript f .
8Gertler, Huckfeldt, and Trigari (2016) and Stuber (2017) provide empirical evidence that
supports this assumption.
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This equation implies that average wage in sector i is a weighted average of reset
wages and past wages, with the weight given by the reset probability.
3.2.6 Retailers and price setting
Following Smets and Wouters (2007), we assume that all retailers use the same mix
of wholesale goods. Retailers repackage the aggregate wholesale goods to produce
differentiated consumption goods, and monopolistically set prices. For simplicity,
we assume that retailers have no other inputs or costs and their output is given by
following constant-return-to-scale technology.
yjkt = ljkt (3.18)
where yjkt denotes the output of retailer j and ljkt the retailer’s demand for the
aggregate wholesale goods. In each period, a fraction 1 − δpk of retailers reoptimise
their prices. Then the real reset price in sector k9 (P
∗
kt
Pt
) is
P ∗kt
Pt
=
p
p − 1
∞∑
s=0
Etξi,smct+s (3.19)
where
ξi,s ≡
(δpkβ)
sc1−σt+s Π
p
t,t+s∑∞
q=0(δ
p
kβ)
qc1−σt+q Π
p−1
t,t+q
(3.20)
Note that the real marginal cost of retailers is given by the real price of the aggregate
wholesale goods.
mct =
Pwt
Pt
(3.21)
The average price in sector k (Pkt) is given by
P 1−
p
kt = δ
p
kP
1−p
kt−1 + (1− δpk)P ∗1−
p
kt (3.22)
This implies that (log-linearised) sectoral average price is a weighted average of reset
prices and past prices, with the weight given by the reset probability.
9We drop the retailer subscript j, since all reoptimising retailers set the same price.
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3.2.7 The rest of the model
The monetary policy is characterized by a simple Taylor rule.
It = (Pt/Pt−1)φpi(yt/y˜)φymt (3.23)
where It is the gross nominal interest rate and mt is an exogenous monetary pol-
icy shock. The log of monetary policy shock follows an AR(1) process; lnmt =
ρm lnmt−1 +mt , where ρm ∈ [0, 1) and mt is an iid shock with zero mean. All output
is consumed in equilibrium:
yt = ct (3.24)
The government finances unemployment benefit (b) with taxes (T ).
b(1− nt) = Tt (3.25)
where nt ≡
∫ 1
0
nfit df is the aggregate employment.
3.3 Calibration
We choose parameter values that are standard in the business cycle models with
the search frictions and in the estimated New Keynesian models. The time period
corresponds to a quarter. The discount factor is set to β = 0.99 and the constant-
relative-risk-aversion parameter is assumed to be σ = 1. We set the coefficient on
inflation in the Taylor rule to φpi = 1.5 and that on output to φy = 0.125. The
autoregressive parameter of the monetary shock is set to ρm = 0.9. The elasticity
of substitution between differentiated (retail and wholesale) goods is p = w = 10,
which implies the steady-state markups of 11% for each firm and retailer.
Turning to the parameter values that are specific to the search and matching
model, the separation rate is calibrated at λ = 0.1. This value is consistent with
the evidence provided by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) for the separation
rate in the US. Similar values are adopted in Walsh (2005) and Krause and Lubik
(2007). For the matching function, we set the match elasticity to µ = 0.5. Workers’
bargaining power is set to η = 0.5. We follow Walsh (2005) and set the job-finding
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rate of workers to p(θ˜) = 0.6. With the workforce size normalised to one, this
assumption implies the steady-state number of unemployed job-seekers to be 0.15.
This is to allow for the potential job seekers such as discouraged workers, since our
model does not include the labour-market participation decision. Our choice of the
number of job-seekers is in the middle of those in related studies: 0.12 in Krause
and Lubik (2007) and 0.33 in Trigari (2009). The firm’s vacancy-filling rate is set to
q(θ˜) = 0.7, following Krause and Lubik (2007) and Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson
(2000). The unemployment benefit ratio (b˜) is the ratio of the unemployment flow
value (b) to the worker’s flow contribution to the match in the steady state (ϕ˜).
Following Hall (2008), we set this parameter to b˜ = 0.7. The flow cost of vacancy
(κ) and unemployment benefit (b) are then implied by the job creation condition
and the steady-state wage equation.
Finally, we turn to the frequency of price and wage adjustments. The frequency
of price adjustment is calibrated based on the dataset provided by Bils and Klenow
(2004). The dataset is based on US Consumer Price Index (CPI) microdata compiled
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. They provide the average proportion of price
adjustments per period for each of the 350 product categories and the corresponding
weights in the CPI. We interpret these proportions of adjustments as Calvo hazard
rates. As in Kara (2015), we aggregate the 350 product categories into 10 sectors,
each with a different hazard rate (1− δpk), for computational ease10. The mean age
of contracts is 2.4 quarters, which is used to calibrate the price-setting of the model
without heterogeneity in price stickiness. Next, the frequency of wage adjustments
is calibrated as follows. We calibrate the distribution of wage contract durations in
our model using data compiled by Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014). They
provide evidence for the distribution of wage spells for the US economy. The data
are based on the Survey of Income and Program Participation conducted by the US
Census Bureau and are for the period from 1996 to 2000. As we did for the frequency
of price adjustments, we assume the probability of wage change is constant, as in
the Calvo model and interpret each wage spell reported in Barattieri, Basu, and
Gottschalk (2014) as a Calvo wage reset probability in a given sector. In other
10See Kara (2015) for more details.
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Table 3.1: Calibration
Subjective discount factor β 0.99
Relative risk aversion σ 1
Elasticity of substitution between goods p, w 10
Coefficient on inflation in Taylor rule φpi 1.5
Coefficient on output in Taylor rule φy 0.125
Monetary shock autoregressive parameter ρm 0.9
Separation rate λ 0.1
Vacancy-filling rate q(θ˜) 0.7
Job-finding rate p(θ˜) 0.6
Number of unemployed job-seekers u˜ 0.15
Elasticity of matching to unemployment µ 0.5
Worker’s bargaining power η 0.5
Unemployment flow value b˜ 0.7
Mean hazard rate in price adjustment 1− δp 0.4
Mean hazard rate in wage adjustment 1− δw 0.18
Note: The number of unemployed job-seekers (u˜) are implied. The other parameters are
fix.
words, we set 1− δwi = 1/Ai, where Ai is the age of sector i. The mean hazard rate
is 0.18. We use this value to calibrate the models without heterogeneity in wage
stickiness.
3.4 Impulse response functions
In this section, we study, in turn, the role of the search frictions and that of het-
erogeneity in nominal rigidities. Figure 3.1 shows the IRF 11 of output to monetary
shocks in the models with and without the search frictions. Both models feature
heterogeneity in nominal rigidities and wage rigidity. In the model with the stan-
11Since our primary interest is the shape of output response, we normalise the responses in a
way that the impact is set at one throughout this chapter, for a comparison purpose.
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dard labour market, output increases on impact and then monotonically reverts to
steady state. In contrast, in the models with the search frictions, output peaks 2
quarters after the shock. Apparently, the search frictions in the labour market have
a potential to reproduce a hump-shaped output response to monetary shocks.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse Response Functions to monetary policy shock in models with
and without the search frictions
Note: The figure reports the output IRF to monetary shock from models with and without search
frictions in the labour market. Both models include heterogeneity in price and wage stickiness.
The IRFs are normalised so that the impact is set at one.
Next, we study the role of heterogeneity in nominal rigidities in models with
the search frictions and both price and wage stickiness. Figure 3.2 shows the IRF
of output to monetary shocks in five models: a model without heterogeneity in
price stickiness and wage stickiness (’Calvo-Calvo search’), a model with hetero-
geneity in price stickiness, but without that in wage stickiness (’MC-Calvo search’),
a model without heterogeneity in price stickiness but with that in wage stickiness
(’Calvo-MC search’), and a model with heterogeneity in both price and wage stick-
iness (’MC-MC search’). For comparison we include previous result: a model with
the standard labour market, with heterogeneity in both price and wage stickiness
(’MC-MC standard’). Two points should be made. First, all models with the search
frictions reproduce an output hump, while the MC-MC standard model does not.
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Importantly, the Calvo-Calvo search model shows a hump in output even though the
model does not include heterogeneity in nominal rigidities. This suggests that the
search frictions alone has potential to help the model generate a hump in output.
Second, heterogeneity in nominal rigidities significantly reinforces this potential.
Output peaks 1 quarter after the shock in the Calvo-Calvo search model, while it
does 2 quarters after the shock in the MC-MC search model. Further, the peak
output response is about 35% higher than that on impact in the MC-MC search
model, while it is only about 15% higher in the Calvo-Calvo search model. The
models with heterogeneity in either price (MC-Calvo search model) or wage sticki-
ness (Calvo-MC search model) fare better than the Calvo-Calvo search model, but
are not as good as the MC-MC search model. This suggests that heterogeneity in
both price and wage stickiness is important for a hump-shaped output dynamics.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions to monetary policy shock in models with
the search frictions
Note: The figure reports the output IRF to monetary shock from models with the search frictions
in labour market. The models are different in whether there is heterogeneity in price and/or wage
stickiness. The IRFs are normalised so that the impact is set at one.
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3.5 Discussion
In this section, we explain how the search frictions make the model generate a hump-
shaped output response to monetary shocks. First, we show that the search frictions
make retailers’ marginal costs history dependent. In particular, it is shown that
the long-term employment relationship that arises from the search and matching
frictions leads to this. Second, we show that the interaction between long-term
employment relationship and heterogeneity in nominal rigidity results in rich output
dynamics in the model. The method of undetermined coefficients reveals that inertial
output response to monetary shocks arises from this interaction.
To clearly illustrate the role of hiring frictions and its interaction with hetero-
geneity in price stickiness, we make three simplifying assumptions. First, we assume
that real wages are fixed: Wt = W˜ and wˆt = 0, where variables with a hat denote
the log-deviations from the steady-state values. Second, we assume β = 1, σ = 1,
and φy = 0. Third, we focus on a special case with only two sectors. In sector 1,
retailers set prices in a perfectly flexible way, while prices are sticky in sector 2. By
using these assumptions, we can reduce the model to four endogenous equations and
one monetary shock process12. The endogenous equations include the equation for
marginal costs, the Phillips curve, the Euler equation, and the Taylor rule.
3.5.1 Long-term relationship and history dependence
We begin with marginal costs13 in the model. As mentioned above, in models with
the standard labour market, real marginal costs are equal to real wages. But within
the search framework, real marginal costs consist of two components: real wages
and hiring costs. This has been frequently pointed out by related literature, e.g.
Krause and Lubik (2007). We denote the real hiring costs by hˆct14. Rearranging
the log-linearised version of Equation (3.8) obtains
12See Appendix for details.
13Retailers’ real marginal costs are the real price of aggregate wholesale goods, and therefore
a fixed-markup over firms’ marginal costs: mct = P
w
t /Pt = (
w
/(w−1))ϕt. Therefore, when log-
linearised, the marginal costs of retailers and firms are the same: mˆct = ϕˆt.
14For the full definition of the hiring costs, see Appendix.
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mˆct = ϕ˜wwˆt + ϕ˜hchˆct (3.26)
where ϕ˜w = w˜/ϕ˜ and ϕ˜hc = h˜c/ϕ˜.
By using the definition of hiring costs together with Equations (3.4) and (3.6),
and the production technologies of firms and retailers, we express hiring costs in
terms of current, a lead, and a lag of output.
hˆct = ϕ1yˆt−1 + ϕ2yˆt + ϕ3Etyˆt+1 (3.27)
where ϕ1 = −ϕµϕλ/λ2
ϕ2 = {ϕµ(1 + (1− λ)ϕλ)− λ(1− λ)} /λ2
ϕ3 = (1− λ)(λ− ϕµ)/λ2
ϕλ = 1− λ− p(θ˜)
ϕµ = µ/(1− µ)
Finally, substituting Equation (3.27) into (3.26) yields an expression for the marginal
costs in the models with the search frictions.
mˆct = ϕ
′
1yˆt−1 + ϕ
′
2yˆt + ϕ
′
3Etyˆt+1 (3.28)
where ϕ′i = ϕ˜hcϕi, i = 1, 2, 3. Equation (3.28) indicates that hiring costs, and
therefore marginal costs negatively depend on lagged output. That is, real marginal
costs are history dependent. We emphasize that this applies to any model with the
search frictions, with or without nominal rigidities, with or without heterogeneity
in nominal rigidities.
Before proceeding, we provide the intuition behind this history dependence. We
begin by decomposing the partial derivative of the hiring costs with respect to the
lagged output (∂hˆct/∂yˆt−1), taking as given the current and future output levels (yˆt
and yˆt+1), as follows.
∂hˆct
∂yˆt−1
=
∂p(θˆt)
∂yˆt−1
· ∂θˆt
∂p(θˆt)
· ∂hˆct
∂θˆt
(3.29)
The first component on the RHS is related to the fact that the equilibrium job-
finding rate of unemployed workers can be lower when the lagged output level is
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higher. This term arises due to the long-term nature of labour contracts under the
search and matching framework. Consider the following log-linearsied equations for
employment and unemployment evolution.
nˆt = (1− λ)nˆt−1 + λ(p(θˆt) + uˆt) (3.30)
uˆt = −p(θ˜)
λ
nˆt−1 (3.31)
The first term of Equation (3.30) indicates the number of the existing workers that
survived the job separation and the second term the number of the new matches.
Therefore if we take the current workers (nˆt) as given, the higher the lagged employ-
ment (nˆt−1), the lower the demand for new hires. Equation (3.31) reflects the fact
that more employment in the past leads to less unemployed job-seekers. Substituting
Equation (3.31) into (3.30) yields
nˆt = ϕλnˆt−1 + λp(θˆt) (3.32)
ϕλ = 1−λ− p(θ˜) in Equation (3.32) implies the net effect of lagged employment on
current employment. When the previous employment is higher, there are more sur-
viving workers, by the fraction 1− λ. On the other hand, there are less job-seekers,
and therefore the number of new matches produced is smaller, by the fraction p(θ˜).
If ϕλ > 0, then the equilibrium job-finding rate can be lower when previous employ-
ment is greater. Considering nˆt−1 = lˆt−1 = yˆt−1, this implies ∂p(θˆt)/∂yˆt−1 = −ϕλ/λ(1−µ).
The second component on the RHS in Equation (3.29) reflects the fact that the
higher job-finding rate of workers require the higher labour market tightness: with
the assumed functional form of the matching function, p(θt) = µmθ1−µt . Therefore
∂θˆt/∂p(θˆt) = 1− µ.
The last component on the RHS in Equation (3.29) arises from the fact that the
vacancy-filling rate of firms is lower when the labour market tightness is higher. That
is, q(θt) = µmθ−µt . Tighter labour market means it takes longer to fill the vacancy,
and therefore the average hiring costs per worker (κ/q(θt)) are higher: ∂hˆct/∂θˆt = µ/λ.
Combining all three components in Equation (3.29) gives us
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∂hˆct
∂yˆt−1
= −ϕµϕλ/λ2 (3.33)
It is trivial to check that ∂hˆct/∂yˆt−1 is equal to the coefficient on the lagged output in
the hiring costs (Equation (3.27)).
3.5.2 Long-term employment relationship and heterogene-
ity in price stickiness
In this subsection, we combine five model equations to derive one reduced-form
equation for output. First, under our assumption of heterogeneity in price stickiness,
the Phillips curve15 is given by
pˆit = Etpˆit+1 +
α1
α2
Etmˆct+1 + {κp2 + (2 + κp2)α1
α2
}mˆct − α1
α2
mˆct−1 (3.34)
where κp2 = (1−δp2)2/δp2.
By combining Equations (3.28) and (3.34) with the Euler equation, the Taylor
rule, and the monetary shock process, we can express the output in terms of its own
lags, leads, and the shock16.
yˆt = τ1yˆt−2 + τ2yˆt−1 + τ3Et−1yˆt + τ4Etyˆt+1 + τ5Etyˆt+2 + τ6Etyˆt+3 + τ7mˆt (3.35)
where τ1 = φpiϕ′1
α1
α2
/τ¯1
τ2 = −{φpi τ¯2ϕ′1 + (ϕ′1 − φpiϕ′2)
α1
α2
}/τ¯1
τ3 = φpiϕ
′
3
α1
α2
/τ¯1
τ4 = {2− τ¯2(φpiϕ′3 − ϕ′2)− (ϕ′1 + ϕ′3 − φpiϕ′2)
α1
α2
}/τ¯1
τ5 = −{1− τ¯2ϕ′3 + (ϕ′2 − φpiϕ′3)
α1
α2
}/τ¯1
τ6 = −ϕ′3
α1
α2
/τ¯1
τ7 = −(1− ρm)/τ¯1
15See Appendix for the second chapter for derivation.
16See Appendix for details.
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τ¯1 = 1 + τ¯2(φpiϕ
′
2 − ϕ′1)− (φpiϕ′1 − ϕ′2)
α1
α2
τ¯2 = κp2 + (2 + κp2)
α1
α2
In the second chapter, we report that, without the search frictions, the reduced-
form output equation that is equivalent to Equation (3.35) has only one lag and two
leads of output on the RHS along with the shock, i.e., τ1 = τ3 = τ6 = 0. Introducing
the search frictions to the model augments the equation with one more lag and lead
of output and the current output based on the expectation in the past (Et−1yˆt). Note
also that the search frictions (ϕ′1 and ϕ′3) and heterogeneity in price stickiness (α1/α2)
interact in various ways and change every coefficient on the RHS of the equation. On
the other hand, when we remove heterogeneity in price stickiness by setting α1 = 0
and κp2 = κp, Equation (3.35) is reduced to the same form as in the second chapter,
i.e., τ1 = τ3 = τ6 = 0 again. Lastly, when we set ϕ′1 = ϕ′3 = α1/α2 = 0 to remove any
backward-lookingness from the search frictions and heterogeneity in price stickiness,
all the lagged terms disappear, i.e. τ1 = τ2 = τ3 = τ6 = 0, and output becomes
purely forward looking. Therefore Equation (3.35) suggests that the search frictions
in the labour market and heterogeneity in nominal rigidity interact with each other,
and this interaction can significantly affect the output dynamics.
Finally, we solve the model by the method of undetermined coefficients. We
guess that yt is a linear function of yˆt−2, yˆt−1, Et−1yˆt, and mˆt.
yˆt = χ1yˆt−2 + χ2yˆt−1 + χ3Et−1yˆt + χmmˆt (3.36)
When we apply our guess, we obtain the following system of equations which we
can solve for the coefficients in Equation (3.36).
τ6χ1χ
3
2 + τ5χ1(1−χ3)χ22 + {τ4χ1(1− χ3) + 2τ6χ21}(1− χ3)χ2
+ (1− χ3)2{τ5χ21 − χ1(1− χ3) + τ1(1− χ3)} = 0
(3.37)
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τ6χ
4
2 + τ5(1− χ3)χ32 + {τ4(1− χ3)2 + 2τ6χ1(1− χ3) + τ6χ1}χ22
+ (1− χ3){τ5(1− χ3)χ1 + τ5χ1 − (1− χ3)2}χ2
+ (1− χ3){τ6χ21 + τ4(1− χ3)χ1 + τ2(1− χ3)2} = 0
(3.38)
τ6χ3χ
3
2+τ5χ3(1− χ3)χ22 + (1− χ3)χ3{τ4(1− χ3) + 2τ6χ1}χ2
+ (1− χ3)2{τ3(1− χ3) + τ5χ1χ3 − χ3(1− χ3)} = 0
(3.39)
χ3[τ6{χ32 + ρmχ22 + (1− χ3)χ2ρm + (1− χ3)ρ3m+
(1− χ3)χ1(2χ2 + ρm)}+ τ5(1− χ3){χ22 + χ2ρm + (1− χ3)ρm
+ χ1(1− χ3)}+ τ4(1− χ3)2{χ2 + ρm − (1− χ3)}] + τ7(1− χ3)3 = 0
(3.40)
To further examine the influence of the long-term employment relationship and
heterogeneity in nominal rigidity, we conduct two exercises17. We vary two key
parameter values: ϕλ for the long-term labour contracts and α1 for heterogeneity in
price stickiness, and check (i) how the coefficients on the output equation change,
and (ii) how the minimum monetary shock persistence required for an output hump
is affected.
For the first experiment, it is useful to check the condition for a hump in output
in terms of the coefficients on the output equation. The minimum requirement
for a hump-shaped output response is yˆt+1 > yˆt. Equation (3.36), together with
Et−1yˆt = 0, implies yˆt = χmmˆt. Also, yˆt+1 is given by (1−χ3)yˆt+1 = χ2yˆt +χmmˆt+1.
Given the monetary shock process and our assumption that t+1 = 0, (1−χ3)yˆt+1 =
χm(χ2 + ρm)mˆt. Imposing yˆt+1 > yˆt gives us the condition for a hump in output to
monetary shocks as follows.
χ2 + χ3 + ρm > 1 (3.41)
This condition implies that when the sum χ2 + χ3 is large, along with sufficiently
persistent shock, the model can generate a hump in output.
17Since the exact analytical solutions for the system of equations (3.37), (3.38), (3.39), and (3.40)
involve solving a higher-order equation system, we rely on numerical solutions from now on.
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Figure 3.3 reports how the coefficients (χ1, χ2, χ3, and χm) on the output equa-
tion change when we vary two parameter values. The first panel plots the coefficients
against the long-term labour contracts (ϕλ). Apparently, the coefficient on one-
period lagged output (χ2) increases with the degree of long-term contracts. While
χ3 is negative in sign and decreases with ϕλ, the sum of the two increases as the
degree of the long-term contracts increases. The second panel shows the coefficients
for different values of the flexible-price sector share. The same pattern arises: χ2
increases, χ3 decreases, and the sum of the two increases with heterogeneity in price
stickiness. This suggests that it is easier for the model to generate a hump in output
to monetary shocks when labour contracts are based on longer-run relationship and
when there is higher degree of heterogeneity in nominal rigidity.
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Figure 3.3: Long-term labour contracts, the flexible-price sector share, and the
coefficients on the output equation
Note: The figure reports the coefficients on Equation (3.35) for different degrees of the long-term
labour contracts (ϕλ) and heterogeneity in price stickiness (α1). For the first panel, we set the
flexible-price sector share to α1 = 0.3. For the second panel, we use the standard calibration for
the long-term contracts: ϕλ = 0.3.
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Next, we measure the potential of the long-term contracts and heterogeneity in
nominal rigidity for an output hump in a more succinct way. Since more persistent
shock leads to a nicer hump, and the shock persistence (ρm) is independent of the
coefficients on output lags, the minimum required shock persistence for a hump in
output fits our purpose well. In other words, if a model requires only lower degree
of monetary shock persistence, we interpret this as indicating greater potential of
the model for a hump-shaped output response. Figure 3.4 shows the minimum
required shock persistence for the second-period peak and the third-period peak of
output responses to monetary shocks. We calculate the minimum shock persistence
by simulating the IRF of output and checking at what value of ρm the conditions
yˆt < yˆt+1 and yˆt+1 < yˆt+2 are met. As shown in the first panel, the long-term nature
of contracts significantly reduces the need for a highly persistent shock. For example,
when ϕλ = 0.1, the shock persistence must be greater than 0.81, for output response
to have a peak at the second period. The persistence must be at least 0.99, for the
third-period output peak. When ϕλ = 0.5, the persistence can be as low as 0.17
for the second-period peak and 0.78 for the third-period peak. The same holds true
for heterogeneity in price stickiness, as shown in the second panel. When α1 = 0.1,
the shock persistence must be greater than 0.67 and 0.95, for the second-period and
the third-period output peaks. When α1 = 0.5, it can be lower at 0.20 and 0.84,
respectively. Clearly, the potential of the model to generate a hump-shaped output
response to monetary shocks is greater when the labour contracts are based on
longer-run relationship and when there is greater heterogeneity in nominal rigidity.
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Figure 3.4: Long-term labour contracts, the flexible-price sector share, and the
minimum required shock persistence
Note: The minimum shock persistences for the second-period peak and the third-period peak
are calculated by simulating the IRF of output and checking at what value of ρm the conditions
yˆt < yˆt+1 and yˆt+1 < yˆt+2 are met.
Lastly, we examine how the long-term contracts and heterogeneity in nominal
rigidity interact. Figure 3.5 shows how this interaction affects the minimum required
monetary shock persistence. The first panel plots the required shock persistence for
an output hump (the second-period peak) against the long-term labour contracts
(ϕλ), for two values of the flexible-price sector share (α1 = 0.0 and α1 = 0.3). In
both cases, the long-term contracts reduce the required shock persistence, but the
decrease is much steeper when there is heterogeneity in price stickiness, that is,
when α1 = 0.3. The second panel plots the required shock persistence against the
flexible-price sector share (α1), for two values of the long-term contracts (ϕλ = 0.0
and ϕλ = 0.3). When ϕλ = 0.3, the decrease in the required shock persistence is very
clear, while the decrease is modest when ϕλ = 0.0. We conclude that the long-term
labour contracts and heterogeneity in nominal rigidity reinforce each other to help
the model generate a hump-shaped output response to monetary shocks.
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Figure 3.5: An interaction between the long-term labour contracts and the flexible-
price sector share on the minimum required shock persistence
Note: The minimum shock persistence for an output hump is calculated by simulating the IRF of
output and checking at what value of ρm the condition yˆt < yˆt+1 is met.
3.6 Summary and conclusion
This chapter has revealed a link between the search and matching frictions and het-
erogeneity in nominal rigidities. The long-term nature of employment relationship
that arises under the search and matching framework makes marginal costs history
dependent. This, when combined with heterogeneity in nominal rigidities, can gen-
erate inertia in output dynamics, leading to a hump-shaped output response if a
monetary shock is persistent.
Since the interaction between the search frictions and heterogeneity in nominal
rigidities can significantly affect inflation and output dynamics in the New Keynesian
models, it is worthwhile to explore its implication in larger-scale models. It will
deepen our understanding of the model to see how the inertia that arises from long-
term employment relationship and heterogeneity in nominal rigidities can interact
with other components of marginal costs in such models, e.g. capital adjustment
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costs and intermediate input prices. In addition, it will be fruitful to examine
whether and how the conclusions on the optimal monetary policy are altered by our
findings.
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Concluding Remarks
We have developed a framework that sheds light on the functioning of the labour
market and its implication for output dynamics and macroeconomy. In the first
chapter, we build a RBC model with the search frictions in the labour market and
heterogeneity in wage stickiness. We show that models that account for heterogene-
ity can match both the observed volatility in unemployment and the cyclicality of
wages, while the models without heterogeneity exhibit too low wage cyclicality. The
key to our results is the presence of flexible wages in the economy. Since flexible
wages respond more to shocks than sticky wages, average wages in our multi-sector
models are more sensitive to shocks than their one-sector counterparts.
The second and the third chapters provide an alternative explanation for a key
feature of monetary-policy transmission mechanism, that output shows a hump-
shaped response to monetary shocks. The second chapter focuses on the role of
heterogeneity in price stickiness for output dynamics. We present a simple New
Keynesian model with the standard labour market and with heterogeneity in price
stickiness. We formally demonstrate how the presence of flexible prices makes price-
setting history dependent. As a result, inflation depends on lagged output. This
history dependence, in the presence of persistent monetary policy shocks, leads to a
hump-shaped response in output.
In the third chapter, we bring together our findings in the first and the second
chapters. Our aim is to revisit the role of the search and matching frictions for
output dynamics in New Keynesian business cycle models, in combination with
heterogeneity in nominal rigidities. We bring the RBC model that we developed
in the first chapter into New Keynesian environment, and introduce heterogeneity
in price stickiness. Our key finding is that long-term employment relationship that
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arises under search and matching framework plays a similar role as heterogeneity
in price stickiness does in the second chapter. It makes marginal costs history
dependent: marginal costs depend on lagged output level. Inflation depends on
marginal costs, and on lagged output level. Therefore previous path of output
becomes relevant.
In the second and the third chapters, we develop a novel method to summarise
the model into one reduced-form equation for output. By using this method, we
analytically show that output exhibits an inertial response in models with the search
frictions and/or heterogeneity in nominal rigidities. The inertia becomes stronger
when there is higher degree of heterogeneity and when labour contracts are based on
longer-term relationship. We also show that the search frictions and heterogeneity
in nominal rigidities reinforce each other to yield a mechanism that generates inertia
in the model.
This dissertation has shown that interactions between a realistic description for
the labour market and that for price/wage setting can help us address important
challenges in macroeconomics. Given the importance of these interactions for output
and inflation dynamics, we suggest that estimating our model in medium-sized New
Keynesian models would be a promising avenue for future research.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
In this Appendix, we present the steady-state of the model economy. The variables
with a tilde denote the steady-state values. Note that the steady-state is the same
across different models. Note also that in the steady state, sectoral wage (w˜i) and
hiring rate (x˜i) are the same across sectors.
Consumption and savings:
1 = β(1 + r˜)
Production:
y˜ = A˜n˜
Separation and hiring rate:
x˜ = λ
Job creation:
κx˜ = A˜− w˜ + β{κ
2
x˜2 + (1− λ)κx˜}
Wage:
w˜ = η{A˜+ βκ
2
x˜2 + βp(θ˜)κx˜}+ (1− η)b
Flows in and out of unemployment:
x˜(1− u˜) = p(θ˜)u˜
Search and matching:
p(θ˜)u˜ = σmu˜
µv˜1−µ
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Resource constraint:
1 =
c˜
y˜
+
κ
2
x˜2
n˜
y˜
Appendix for Chapter 2
In this Appendix, we present the derivation of the output equation (Equation (2.13)
for the MC). We first deal with the case in which β = 1 and φy = 0, which is
presented in Section 3 of Chapter 2 of the main text. We also present the output
equation for a more general case when β 6= 1 and φy 6= 0.
Phillips curve in sector 1 and 2 are given, respectively, by
pi1t = γ(yt − yt−1) + pit (B.1)
pi2t = Etpi2t+1 + κ2(γyt − p2t) (B.2)
Substituting Equation (B.2) into aggregate inflation pit = α1pi1t + α2pi2t and rear-
ranging yield
pit = pi2t +
α1
α2
γ(yt − yt−1) (B.3)
Solving Equation (B.3) for pi2t, bring it forward by one period to obtain pi2t+1, and
taking expectations at time t yield
Etpi2t+1 = Etpit+1 − α1
α2
γ(Etyt+1 − yt) (B.4)
By substituting Etpi2t+1 in Equation (B.4) into Equation (B.2) and making use of
Equations (2.4) and (2.8), we obtain
pi2t = Etpit+1 − α1
α2
γ(Etyt+1 − yt) + κ2(1 + α1
α2
)γyt (B.5)
When we substitute Equation (B.5) into (B.3), we obtain the Phillips curve in the
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MC. This corresponds to Equation (2.12) in the main text.
pit = Etpit+1 − α1
α2
γEtyt+1 + τ¯2yt − α1
α2
γyt−1 (B.6)
where τ¯2 ≡ {κ2 + (2 + κ2)α1/α2}γ. Next, by combining the Euler equation and the
Taylor rule, we obtain
yt − Etyt+1 + φpipit +mt − Etpit+1 = 0 (B.7)
We solve Equation (B.6) for Etpit+1, substitute it into Equation (B.7), and solve the
resulting equation for pit to obtain
pit =
1
1− φpi [−(1 +
α1
α2
)Etyt+1 + (1 + τ¯2)yt − α1
α2
γyt−1 +mt] (B.8)
We bring Equation (B.8) forward by one period to obtain pit+1, take expectations
at time t, and substitute the resulting expressions for pit and Etpit+1 into Equation
(B.7), making use of Etmt+1 = ρmmt, to obtain Equation (2.13) in the main text.
Finally, we present the output equation for a more general case when β 6= 1 and
φy 6= 0.
yt = τ1yt−1 + τ2Etyt+1 + τ3Etyt+2 + τ4mt
where τ1 = φpi
α1
α2
γ/τ¯1
τ2 = (2β + βφy + βφpi
α1
α2
γ + τ¯2)/τ¯1
τ3 = −β(1 + α1
α2
γ)/τ¯1
τ4 = −(1− βρm)/τ¯1
τ¯1 = 1 + φy + φpi τ¯2 +
α1
α2
γ
τ¯2 = {κ2 + (1 + β + κ2)α1
α2
}γ
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Appendix for Chapter 3
The definition of the hiring costs
A straight forward manipulation of the Equation (3.8) obtains
ϕt︸︷︷︸
Marginal costs
= wt︸︷︷︸
Real wage
+
κ
q(θt)
− (1− λ)β κ
Etq(θt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hiring costs
(C.1)
We define the sum of the second and the third terms on the RHS of Equation (C.1)
as hiring costs. The first term,
κ
q(θt)
, denotes the current (average) cost of hiring
one additional worker. The second term, −(1− λ)β κ
Etq(θt+1)
, indicates that the
discounted continuation value of a surviving worker should be subtracted from the
current costs.
A reduced-form model
Under the assumptions made in Section 4 of Chapter 3, the model can be represented
by the following log-linearsied equation system.
Employment
nˆt = (1− λ)nˆt−1 + λ{p(θˆt) + uˆt} (C.2)
Unemployment
uˆt = −p(θ˜)
λ
nˆt−1 (C.3)
Job creation condition
κ
q(θ˜)
µθˆt = ϕ˜ϕˆt − w˜wˆt + (1− λ) κ
q(θ˜)
(EtΛˆt,t+1 − µEtθˆt+1) (C.4)
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Production
yˆt = lˆt = nˆt (C.5)
Resource constraint
yˆt = cˆt (C.6)
Marginal costs of firms and retailers
mˆct = ϕˆt (C.7)
Relative price of sector 1
pˆ1t = mˆct (C.8)
Phillips curve in sector 2
pˆi2t = Etpˆi2t+1 + κp2(mˆct − pˆ2t) (C.9)
Sectoral inflation
pˆit = pˆit−1 + pˆiit − pˆit, i = 1, 2 (C.10)
Aggregate inflation
pˆit = α1pˆi1t + α2pˆi2t (C.11)
Euler equation
cˆt = Etcˆt+1 − (ˆit − Etpˆit+1) (C.12)
Taylor rule
iˆt = φpipˆit + mˆt (C.13)
Monetary shock process
mˆt = ρmmˆt−1 + mt (C.14)
By combining Equations (C.2), (C.3), (C.5), and (C.6), together with p(θˆt) =
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(1− µ)θˆt, we obtain
θˆt =
1
λ(1− µ)(yˆt − ϕλyˆt−1) (C.15)
By combining Equation (C.4) and (C.7), together with wˆt = 0 and Λˆt,t+1 =
−cˆt+1 + cˆt gives
mˆct = ϕ˜hchˆct (C.16)
where
hˆct =
µ
λ
{θˆt − (1− λ)Etθˆt+1}+ (1− λ)(Etyˆt+1 − yˆt) (C.17)
Substituting Equations (C.15) and (C.17) into (C.16) obtains the following ex-
pression for the marginal costs of retailers.
mˆct = ϕ
′
1yˆt−1 + ϕ
′
2yˆt + ϕ
′
3Etyˆt+1 (C.18)
This corresponds to Equation (3.28) in the text.
Next, by combining Equations (C.8), (C.9), (C.10), and (C.11), we obtain the
following aggregate Phillips curve.
pˆit = Etpˆit+1 +
α1
α2
Etmˆct+1 + {κp2 + (2 + κp2)α1
α2
}mˆct − α1
α2
mˆct−1 (C.19)
Substituting Equation (C.6) into (C.12) gives
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − (ˆit − Etpˆit+1) (C.20)
Consequently we have a five-equation reduced form of the model that includes
Equations (C.18), (C.19), (C.20), (C.13), and (C.14).
The derivation of Equation (3.35)
First, we combine the Euler equation and the Taylor rule to obtain
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 + φpipˆit + mˆt − Etpˆit+1 (C.21)
90
We substitute the marginal costs (Equation (C.18)) into the aggregate Phillips
curve (Equation (C.19)) to obtain
pˆit = Etpˆit+1 − α1
α2
ϕ′1yˆt−2 + (τ¯2ϕ
′
1 −
α1
α2
ϕ′2)yˆt−1 −
α1
α2
ϕ′3Et−1yˆt
− (α1
α2
ϕ′1 − τ¯2ϕ′2)yˆt − (
α1
α2
ϕ′2 − τ¯2ϕ′3)Etyˆt+1 −
α1
α2
ϕ′3Etyˆt+2
(C.22)
By solving Equation (C.22) for Etpˆit+1, substituting it into Equation (C.21), and
solving the resulting equation for pˆit, we obtain
pˆit =
1
φpi − 1
[
α1
α2
ϕ′1yˆt−2 + (
α1
α2
ϕ′2 − τ¯2ϕ′1)yˆt−1 +
α1
α2
ϕ′3Et−1yˆt
(
α1
α2
ϕ′1 − τ¯2ϕ′2 − 1)yˆt + (
α1
α2
ϕ′2 − τ¯2ϕ′3 + 1)Etyˆt+1 +
α1
α2
ϕ′3Etyˆt+2
] (C.23)
We bring Equation (C.23) forward to obtain Etpˆit+1, and substitute pˆit, Etpˆit+1, and
Equation (C.14) into (C.21) to obatin Equation (3.35) in the main text.
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